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In this paper, our goal is to establish a sound formal foundation for rigorous research regarding measures of uncertainty
that are applicable to a broad class of theories of imprecise probabilities. We pursue this goal by formulating a well-justiﬁed
system of axiomatic requirements for these measures. As it is well-known, two types of uncertainty, which are usually called
nonspeciﬁcity and conﬂict, coexist in the various theories of imprecise probabilities, but their individual measures have been
found formalizable only in terms of appropriate disaggregations of a total, aggregate measure of uncertainty [3]. Recognizing
these facts, we formulate our system of axioms for total measures of uncertainty, taking into account that they aggregate
nonspeciﬁcity and conﬂict, and we examine various disaggregations of those total measures that satisfy these requirements.
While most of previous investigations regarding total uncertainty measures have been restricted to Dempster-Shafer The-
ory (DST) [4–6], our system of axiomatic requirements can be equivalently deﬁned for belief functions of DST and for credal
sets. It is thus applicable to much broader class of theories of imprecise probabilities.
The paper has the following structure. After introducing relevant terminology and notation (Section 2), an overview of
previous work (Section 3), requisite mathematical background regarding operations on monotone measures and credal sets
(Section 4), and independence principles in the theories of imprecise probabilities (Section 5), we formulate our axioms for
uncertainty measures on belief functions and credal sets (Sections 6–8). Then, we analyze the algebraic structure of the set of
all possible measures of total uncertainty under various acceptable normalizations (Section 9), examine various ways of
disaggregating total uncertainty into nonspeciﬁcity and conﬂict (Section 10), and analyze in more detail requirements of. All rights reserved.
-2008 Proceedings (see [1,2]).
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formation and address the issue of the uniqueness of total uncertainty measure. Conclusions from our investigation as well
as some remaining open problems for future research are summarized in Section 12.
In addition to developing a sound axiomatic framework for measures of total uncertainty on belief functions and on cre-
dal sets, numerous results are derived in this paper for these measures and their disaggregations. Perhaps the most signif-
icant of these results are: (a) results in Section 9 regarding the algebraic structure of the set of all possible total uncertainty
measures on belief functions under various normalization conditions; (b) results in Section 10 regarding possible disaggre-
gations of total uncertainty into measures of nonspeciﬁcity and conﬂict; (c) results in Section 11 regarding additivity of
uncertainty measures on credal sets for various types of independence; and (d) results in Section 12 regarding the relation-
ship between measures of nonspeciﬁcity and conﬂict on belief functions.2. Relevant terminology and notation
Let X denote a nonempty and ﬁnite set of all considered alternatives (a universal set), and let 2X denote the power set of
X. A set function l : 2X ! ½0;1 is called a monotone measure if it possesses the following properties: (a) lð;Þ ¼ 0; (b)
lðXÞ ¼ 1; and (c) A;B 2 2X and A#B implies lðAÞ 6 lðBÞ. We denote the set of all monotone measures on 2X by MmonðXÞ.
Every probability measure, P, is a special monotone measure that possesses, in addition to properties (a)–(c), the property
of additivity: PðAÞ þ PðBÞ ¼ PðA [ BÞ for any A;B 2 2X such that A \ B ¼ ;. We denote the set of all probability measures on
2X by MprðXÞ. Let l1;l2 2 MmonðXÞ and l1ðAÞ 6 l2ðAÞ for all A 2 2X. Then we write l1 6 l2. A monotone measure
l 2 Mmon is called a lower probability measure if the set PðlÞ ¼ fP 2 Mprjl 6 Pg is not empty. The set PðlÞ of probability mea-
sures is called the core of l.
An important class of special monotone measures consists of measures that satisfy, in addition to properties (a)–(c), also
the inequality lðAÞ þ lðBÞ 6 lðA \ BÞ þ lðA [ BÞ for all sets A;B 2 2X. These special monotone measures are usually called
Choquet capacities of order 2 or, more recently, 2-monotone measures. LetM2monðXÞ denote the set of all 2-monotone mea-
sures on 2X. Choquet capacities of order k (or k-monotone measures) have also been deﬁned for integers k > 2 [7], but they
are not needed in this paper.
Imprecise probabilities on 2X can be represented by sets of probability measures. It is convenient and rational (see [8,9]
for justiﬁcation) that each such set of probability measures is a convex polytope (a convex set with a ﬁnite number of ex-
treme points). Such convex sets of probability measures are called credal sets. Let the set of all credal sets on X be denoted
by CrðXÞ. Two set functions on 2X, a lower probability measure P and an upper probability measure P, are associated with
each credal set P 2 CrðXÞ. For all A 2 2X, they are deﬁned by the formulas PðAÞ ¼ infP2PPðAÞ; PðAÞ ¼ supP2PPðAÞ. It follows
directly from these formulas that functions P and P
 are dual in the sense that PðAÞ ¼ 1 PðAcÞ, where Ac denotes the com-
plement of A. Due to this duality between P and P
, it is sufﬁcient to work with one of them, say P.
A lower probability measure l deﬁned on the algebra 2X is called coherent iff lðAÞ ¼ inffPðAÞjP 2 PðlÞg for all A 2 2X. Let
P be a coherent lower probability measure deﬁned by credal set P 2 CrðXÞ. Then, we can deﬁne another credal set by the
formula PðPÞ ¼ fP 2 MprðXÞjP P Pg. It is clear that P#PðPÞ and, in general, P– PðPÞ. Therefore, the correspondence be-
tween credal sets and associated coherent lower probabilities is not bijective, and, in general, we lose information transform-
ing credal sets to coherent lower probabilities.
Any given l 2 MmonðXÞ is uniquely represented by a set function m that is obtained from l via the Möbius transform [3]mðAÞ ¼
X
B#A
ð1ÞjAnBjlðBÞ; A 2 2X:The inverse transform is deﬁned via the formulalðAÞ ¼
X
B#A
mðBÞ; A 2 2X:Function m possesses two properties: mð;Þ ¼ 0 andPB22XmðBÞ ¼ 1. When, in addition to these properties, m is nonnegative,
the associated monotone measure is called a belief function. A theory of uncertainty based on belief functions is called in the
literature a Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST). We denote the set of all belief functions on 2X byMbelðXÞ. Alternatively, belief func-
tions can also be deﬁned as Choquet capacities of order 1, which are also referred to as totally monotone measures.
The meaning of Möbius transform can be explained by the set functions ghBi, deﬁned by ghBiðAÞ ¼ 1 when B#A and
ghBiðAÞ ¼ 0 otherwise. Then any l 2 MmonðXÞ can be represented as l ¼
P
B22XmðBÞghBi where m is the Möbius transform
of l. It easy to check that set functions ghBi form the basis of the linear space that consists of all set functions on 2
X, and
the Möbius transform can be understood as the representation of such set functions through this basis.
We also use symbols, for example M2mon without reference to a ﬁnite space. Such symbols denote all possible functions
of the designated type on ﬁnite spaces.3. A historical overview
The purpose of this section is to present an overview of major results regarding justiﬁable measures of uncertainty for
imprecise probabilities. The results are presented chronologically by their appearance in the literature. For a more complete
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sume that the reader is familiar, at least conceptually, with the various properties that justiﬁable measures of uncertainty are
required to possess, such as subadditivity, additivity, monotonicity, continuity, expansibility, symmetry, branching, range,
and normalization. These properties, which have been employed as axioms for characterizing uncertainty measures, are crit-
ically examined in Section 6.
The ﬁrst justiﬁable way of measuring the amount of uncertainty was established in classical (crisp) possibility theory. In
this theory, uncertainty is associated with a ﬁnite and nonempty set A of possible alternatives ðA#XÞ. That is, we have evi-
dence that alternatives in set X n A are not possible. It was shown by Hartley [10] that the only sensible way to measure
uncertainty associated with any set A of possible alternatives is to employ the functional HðAÞ ¼ c logbjAj, where jAj denotes
the cardinality of A and b; c are positive constants (b > 1) that are determined by the choice of a measurement unit (a nor-
malization). By choosing b ¼ 2 and c ¼ 1, we obtain HðAÞ ¼ 1 when jAj ¼ 2. This most commonly used unit of measurement
is called a bit. One bit of uncertainty is our uncertainty about which of two possible alternatives (e.g. possible truth values of
a simple proposition) is the actual one. When choosing bits as measurements units, we obtainHðAÞ ¼ log2jAj:
This uncertainty measure is usually called a Hartley measure. Its uniqueness on axiomatic grounds was proven later by Rényi
[11]. The type of uncertainty measured by H is usually called nonspeciﬁcity.
In probability theory, a justiﬁable measure of uncertainty was derived by Shannon [12]. This measure, which is usually
referred to as the Shannon entropy, is a functional, S, that is deﬁned for each given probability distribution function p on a
ﬁnite set X by the formulaSðpÞ ¼ 
X
x2X
pðxÞ log2pðxÞ;where it is assumed that 0log20 ¼ 0 ðlimx!0x log2x ¼ 0Þ, provided that the measurement units are bits. The uniqueness of
this functional as the probabilistic measure of uncertainty has been proven, under the normalization requirement that
Sð0:5;0:5Þ ¼ 1, in numerous ways [13].
The type of uncertainty that is measured by the Shannon entropy is well captured by the name ‘‘conﬂict”. A rationale for
using this name can be seen when the above formula is rewritten asSðpÞ ¼ 
X
x2X
pðxÞ log2 1
X
x–x
pðxÞ
" #
:For each x 2 X, the termPx–xpðxÞ represents the total evidential claim that conﬂicts with the one focusing on x, and the
functionConðxÞ ¼ log2 1
X
x–x
pðxÞ
" #expresses the same conﬂict at a different scale. This shows that the Shannon entropy measures the mean (expected) value of
conﬂict among evidential claims expressed by each given probability distribution function p on X. This also means that the
Shannon entropy measures a very different type of uncertainty than the uncertainty (nonspeciﬁcity) measured by the Hart-
ley measure. This important distinction, which is often blurred in the literature on classical information theory, was ﬁrst rec-
ognized by Kolmogorov [14].
When the classical possibility and probability theories were generalized, it was realized that both types of uncertainty,
nonspeciﬁcity and conﬂict, coexist in these generalized theories. That required that the Hartley measure and the Shannon
entropy be properly generalized to be applicable in the various generalized theories.
The ﬁrst successful generalization of the Hartley measure was obtained by Higashi and Klir [15]. It was a generalization of
the Hartley measure from crisp possibilities to graded possibilities. This generalized Hartley measure, GH, which was further
generalized to DST by Dubois and Prade [16], is deﬁned in terms of the Möbius transform m of any given belief function Bel
by the formulaGHðmÞ ¼
X
;A#X
mðAÞ log2jAj:The uniqueness of this generalized Hartley measure was proven in 1987 for graded possibilities by Klir and Mariano [17] and
for DST by Ramer [18].
Efforts to generalize the Shannon entropy to the theory of graded possibilities and DST were less successful. Although sev-
eral intuitively promising candidates for generalized Shannon measure, GS, were proposed in the literature in the 1980s and
early 1990s, each of them was found to violate the essential requirement of subadditivity. This violation would have been
acceptable if subadditivity were satisﬁed for the sum GH þ GS. Unfortunately, none of the proposed measure of GS resulted
in a subadditive sum GH þ GS. A digest of these frustrating efforts is given in [3].
In the early 1990s, the frustrating attempts to generalize the Shannon entropy to DST were replaced with attempts to ﬁnd
an aggregated measure of both types of uncertainty. An aggregate measure that satisﬁes all the required properties was
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tional S that for each belief function Bel 2 MbelðXÞ is deﬁned by the formulaSðBelÞ ¼ max
P2PðBelÞ
SðPÞ;where the maximum is taken over the set PðBelÞ ¼ fP 2 MprðXÞjP P Belg. This functional can be readily generalized to any
given credal set, as was shown by Abellán and Moral [19]. Useful algorithms for computing S were developed by various
authors for DST, the theory based on 2-monotone measures, and the theory based of reachable interval-valued probability
distributions [3].
The uniqueness of S has not been established as yet, but it was shown by Harmanec [4] that among all justiﬁable aggre-
gate measures of uncertainty, S is the smallest one. This result means that the uniqueness of S can be proven, if provable at
all, by showing that S is also the largest aggregate measure. It also means that alternative aggregate measures of uncer-
tainty, if any of them exist, must be greater than S. One possibility is to consider the sum GH þ S as an alternative aggregate
measure. This measure satisﬁes (under proper normalization) all requirements for a total measure of uncertainty in DST, as
formulated in [4], and it is considerably more sensitive to changes in evidence than S.
Although the functional S is acceptable on mathematical grounds as an aggregate measure of uncertainty in any uncer-
tainty theory where evidence can be represented in terms of credal sets, it is highly insensitive to changes in evidence due to
its aggregated nature (as illustrated in [3]). Moreover, it does not explicitly show amounts of the two coexisting types of
uncertainty: nonspeciﬁcity and conﬂict. It is thus desirable to disaggregate it.
The idea of disaggregating S was ﬁrst suggested and explored by Klir [20]. Assuming that S ¼ GH þ GS, where S and GH
are well-established measures, GS can be deﬁned indirectly as GS ¼ S  GH, provided that S  GHP 0. Since this inequality
was proven by Smith [21], the suggested deﬁnition of GS is meaningful, and the disaggregated total uncertainty measure, TU,
is deﬁned as the pair TU ¼ hGH;GSi. Now, it is guaranteed that the sum GH þ GS ¼ S satisﬁes all the required mathematical
properties, and it does not matter whether each of the two components of TU satisﬁes them as well. The idea of disaggre-
gating S into two components – a measure of nonspeciﬁcity and a measure of conﬂict – opened new possibilities. One of
them is based on the recognition that the following two functionals can be deﬁned for any credal set P 2 CrðXÞ:SðPÞ ¼ max
P2P
SðPÞ;
SðPÞ ¼ min
P2P
SðPÞ:The signiﬁcance of these functionals (and their difference) for capturing uncertainty associated with credal sets was ﬁrst rec-
ognized by Kapur et al. [22,23]. Their role for disaggregating S was suggested by Smith and Klir [21,24]. More recently, Abel-
lán and Moral [25,26] further investigated properties of the difference S  S and described an algorithm for calculating the
value of SðPÞ for any given credal set P. They suggested that it is reasonable to view this difference as an alternative measure
of nonspeciﬁcity. That is, they suggested to deﬁne a measure of nonspeciﬁcity, N, for each credal set P by the functional
NðPÞ ¼ SðPÞ  SðPÞ. They also showed that functional N possesses the properties of monotonicity, proper range, continuity,
and additivity under the deﬁnition of strong independence. These properties, which every measure of nonspeciﬁcity must
possess, motivated the suggestion that this functional may be viewed as a measure of nonspeciﬁcity. Unfortunately, contrary
to the generalized Hartley measure, functional N violates the essential requirement of subadditivity in virtually any uncer-
tainty theory, including DST. This means that N is not acceptable alone as a measure of nonspeciﬁcity. However, when con-
sidered as a component of a disaggregated total uncertainty measure, then the lack of subadditivity is of no consequence. It
only matters that the aggregated measure of uncertainty S satisﬁes all the essential requirements, including subadditivity.
This suggests to deﬁne an alternative measure of disaggregated total uncertainty, aTU, as the pair aTU ¼ hS  S; Si. Observe
that the ﬁrst component of aTU is the alternative nonspeciﬁcity measure N, while the second component, S, is a generalized
Shannon measure (i.e., a general measure of conﬂict). Neither of these components is subadditive and, hence, they are not
acceptable on their own. However, when they are aggregated, we obtain S and, clearly, this functional satisﬁes all the essen-
tial requirements.
It is interesting to observe that the functional S has often been considered as one of the candidates for the generalized
Shannon entropy, intuitively perhaps as the most appealing candidate. It was dismissed since it is not subadditive and nei-
ther the sum GH þ S is subadditive. However, it is perfectly justiﬁable when aggregated with the alternative measure of
nonspeciﬁcity, N ¼ S  S. In fact, some of the other candidates considered for the generalized Shannon entropy could
now be considered on similar grounds. This opens a new area of research, whose purpose is to compare the various candi-
dates for GS with functional S.
One advantage of the alternative measure of disaggregated total uncertainty aTU for the various theories of imprecise
probabilities is that both its components are deﬁned solely in terms of credal sets. As shown recently by Abellán and Klir
[27], both components of aTU are additive under strong independence, but they are not additive under mass independence.
For the components of TU, it is just the other way: they are additive under mass independence, but they are not additive
under strong independence. Furthermore, the aggregate uncertainty S is additive under both strong and mass indepen-
dence. These results seem to indicate that the applicability of TU is restricted to DST, where the Möbius transform m of
set functions is positive. Outside DST, where function m has negative values, the deﬁnition of mass independence is
questionable.
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In this section we introduce algebraic operations on monotonemeasures and credal sets, which are later used in the intro-
duced axioms. The equivalence of axioms follows by the proven identity of operations, produced on 2-monotone measures
and corresponding credal sets.
(1) Convex sum of monotone measures and credal sets. Let l1;l2 2 MmonðXÞ; a 2 ½0;1. Then l ¼ al1 þ ð1 aÞl2 is deﬁned
by lðAÞ ¼ al1ðAÞ þ ð1 aÞl2ðAÞ;A 2 2X. Analogously, for P1;P2 2 CrðXÞ; a 2 ½0;1, we write that P ¼ aP1 þ ð1 aÞP2
if P ¼ fPjP ¼ aP1 þ ð1 aÞP2; P1 2 P1; P2 2 P2g.
(2) Mapping of a monotone measure and a credal set. Let X and Y be ﬁnite nonempty sets, u : X ! Y ;l 2 MmonðXÞ. Then
lu 2 MmonðYÞ is deﬁned by luðAÞ ¼ lðu1ðAÞÞ, where u1ðAÞ ¼ fx 2 XjuðxÞ 2 Ag;A 2 2Y . Analogously, for the same
X;Y ;u : X ! Y and P 2 CrðXÞ, we deﬁne Pu ¼ fPujP 2 Pg, where PuðAÞ ¼ Pðu1ðAÞÞ and A 2 2Y .
(3) Marginal monotone measures and credal sets. Let l 2 MmonðX  YÞ. Then marginals lX 2 MmonðXÞ and lY 2 MmonðYÞ of l
are deﬁned by lXðAÞ ¼ lðA YÞ;A 2 2X; lYðBÞ ¼ lðX  BÞ;B 2 2Y . Analogously, if P 2 CrðX  YÞ then PX ¼ fPX jP 2 Pg
and PY ¼ fPY jP 2 Pg.
The following proposition establishes that the introduced operations on set functions from M2mon can be equivalently
represented via the corresponding credal sets.
Proposition 1. For any l 2 M2monðXÞ, let us deﬁne the credal set PðlÞ ¼ fPjP P l; P 2 MprðXÞg. Then the following properties
hold:
(1) For all l1;l2 2 M2monðXÞ;l1 6 l2 (or l1 ¼ l2) iff Pðl1Þ  Pðl2Þ (or Pðl1Þ ¼ Pðl2Þ).
(2) For all l1;l2 2 M2monðXÞ;Pðal1 þ ð1 aÞl2Þ ¼ aPðl1Þ þ ð1 aÞPðl2Þ.
(3) PuðlÞ ¼ PðluÞ for any l 2 M2monðXÞ and any u : X ! Y , where X and Y are ﬁnite sets;
(4) Let X;Y be ﬁnite sets and l 2 M2monðX  YÞ. Then ðPðlÞÞX ¼ PðlXÞ and ðPðlÞÞY ¼ PðlYÞ.Proof. It is easy to see that (1) is valid up to the set of all coherent lower probabilities, and it is well-known that any 2-mono-
tone measure is a coherent lower probability. One can ﬁnd a proof of (2) in [28]. Now we show that (3) is also true. We notice
ﬁrst that the inclusion PuðlÞ#PðluÞ follows directly from the property: if l; P 2 MmonðXÞ and l 6 P then lu 6 Pu, which is
clearly a consequence of the deﬁnition of lu and Pu. To prove the opposite inclusion PuðlÞ  PðluÞ, we show that the
extreme points of PuðlÞ are images of the extreme points of PðlÞ. Since lu is 2-monotone, any extreme point Pc 2 Pu of
Pu is deﬁned by a complete chain c ¼ fB0;B1; . . . ;Bng in 2Y [29], where ; ¼ B0  B1      Bn ¼ Y; jBi n Bi1j ¼ 1, and
PcðBiÞ ¼ luðBiÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n. We see that u1ðcÞ ¼ fu1ðB0Þ;u1ðB1Þ; . . . ;u1ðBnÞg is also a chain in 2X , but it is not necessarily
complete. Therefore, we can construct a complete chain c in 2X withu1ðcÞ# c. It is clear thatuðcÞ ¼ c and Puc ¼ Pc, where
Pc 2 PðlÞ is deﬁned by Pc ðAÞ ¼ lðAÞ if A 2 c, i.e. (3) is proved. We show now that (4) follows from (3). Let
l 2 M2monðX  YÞ. Consider a mapping u : X  Y ! X deﬁned by uððx; yÞÞ ¼ x; x 2 X; y 2 Y . Then lu ¼ lX ;Pu ¼ PX , i.e. (4)
is a special case of (3). h5. Independence principles
In the theory of imprecise probabilities, the concept of independence can be deﬁned in multiple ways [30–33]. In this
paper, we follow, by and large, the deﬁnitions introduced in [32]. However, we also try to show connections between prin-
ciples of independence and the two types of uncertainty: conﬂict and nonspeciﬁcity.
In our discussion of independence, we consider arbitrary subsets of probability measures deﬁned on 2X , where X is a ﬁnite
set. Let the set of possible subsets of this type be denoted by SprðXÞ. We can use operations on such sets as on credal sets
without any restriction.
Let P 2 SprðX  YÞ, where X and Y are ﬁnite nonempty sets, and assume that set P describes information about two random
variables, nX and nY , with values in X and Y, respectively. We say that nY is irrelevant to nX if knowing an exact value of nY has
no inﬂuence on the description of nX . They are independent if nX is irrelevant to nY and nY is irrelevant to nX .
Consider ﬁrst how independence is described in probability theory, i.e. we restrict ourselves to the case, where the con-
sidered sets are singletons. Let P 2 MprðX  YÞ be the joint probabilistic description of nX and nY . Then they are described sep-
arately by their marginal probability measures, PX and PY . Assume that we know that nY takes the value y 2 Y . Then the
conditional probability measure Pjy 2 MprðXÞ given y is deﬁned by PjyðAÞ ¼ PðA fygÞ=PðX  fygÞ, where A 2 2X and this for-
mula can be applied if PðX  fygÞ ¼ PYðfygÞ – 0. In this case we have the equality
P
y2YPYðfygÞPjy ¼ PX and, according to the
independence principle, nY is irrelevant to nX iff Pjy ¼ PX for any y 2 Y with PYðfygÞ– 0. Similarly, we deﬁne when nX is irrel-
evant to nY . We say that random variables nX and nYare independent if nX is irrelevant to nY , and nY is irrelevant to nX . In prob-
ability theory the ﬁrst condition implies the second, i.e. if nX is irrelevant to nY , then they are independent. However, this
property does not hold when dealing with imprecise probabilities. If we know that nX and nY are independent random
variables, then their joint probabilistic description is deﬁned uniquely through the marginal probability measures, PX and
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where x 2 X and y 2 Y .
Consider now a more general case of sets in SprðXÞ. In this case uncertainty is caused both by random behavior of observ-
ing experiments and their inexact description. Therefore, we should consider two types of conditioning. We get the ﬁrst one
if we assume that we know exactly the probabilistic description, say PY 2 PY , of the random variable, nY . Then we get the
conditional set PjPY ¼ fl 2 PjlY ¼ PYg given PY . Now, assume that we know both the probability distribution and the true
value y 2 Y of nY in the experiment. This situation is described by the credal set1 PjPY ;y ¼ fljyjl 2 PjPY g for any y 2 Y with
PY ðfygÞ > 0. We say that nY is fully irrelevant (or irrelevant) to nX iff PjPY ;y ¼ ðPjPY ÞX ¼ PX for any PY 2 PY and any y 2 Y with
PY ðfygÞ > 0. In other words, nY is irrelevant to nX iff the exact information concerning the random variable nY has no inﬂuence
on the description of the random variable nX . This deﬁnition is not symmetrical, i.e. the statement ‘‘nX is fully irrelevant to nY”
does not imply ‘‘nY is fully irrelevant to nX”. Therefore, we say that nX and nY are fully independent (or independent) if the full
irrelevance is fulﬁlled in both directions.
The following are two possible types [32] of weakening this basic deﬁnition of independence, either of which may be use-
ful in some concrete situations:
Type 1. nY is marginally irrelevant to nX if ðPjPY ÞX ¼ PX for any PY 2 PY . nX and nY are called marginally independent if nX is
marginally irrelevant to nY and nY is marginally irrelevant to nX .
This type of independence is based only on nonspeciﬁcity of nX and nY .
Type 2. Let Pjy ¼
S
PY2PY jPY ðfygÞ>0 PjPY ;y. Then nY is epistemically irrelevant to nX if Pjy ¼ PX for any y 2 Y such that Pjy – ;. nX
and nY are called epistemically independent if nX is epistemically irrelevant to nY and nY is epistemically irrelevant
to nX . This deﬁnition is based only on conﬂict associated with nX and nY .Lemma 1. Let random variables nX and nY be described by a set P 2 SprðX  YÞ. Then they are independent if
P ¼ fPX  PY jPX 2 PX ; PY 2 PYg.
Proof. Let us take an arbitrary PY 2 PY and y 2 Y with PYðfygÞ > 0. Then1 LetPjPY
 
X ¼ PX  PYð ÞX jPX 2 PX
  ¼ PX jPX 2 PXf g ¼ PX :PjPY ;y ¼ ðPX  PYÞjyjPX 2 PX
n o
¼ PX jPX 2 PXf g ¼ PX :Therefore, nY is irrelevant to nX . Because of the symmetrical deﬁnition of P, we conclude that nX is irrelevant to nY . Hence, nX
and nY are independent random variables. h
Lemma 2. Let random variables nX and nY be described by a setP ¼ fP 2 MprðX  YÞjPX 2 PX ; PY 2 PYg
and let PX ¼ PðghBiÞ for some nonempty set B#X. Then nY is irrelevant to nX.
Proof. We see that in this case PjPY ;y ¼ ðPjPY ÞX ¼ PðghBiÞ ¼ PX . h
Lemma 3. Let random variables nX and nY be described by a set P 2 SprðX  YÞ and let PY ¼ fPYg. Then nX and nY are independent
iff P ¼ fPX  PY jPX 2 PXg.
Proof. Sufﬁciency follows from Lemma 1. Necessity follows from the fact that PjPX for PX 2 PX is in this case a singleton with
ðPjPX ÞX ¼ fPXg; ðPjPX ÞY ¼ fPYg, and the condition PjPX ;x1 ¼ PjPX ;x2 for any x1; x2 2 X with PXðfxkgÞ > 0; k ¼ 1;2, implies that
PjPX ¼ fPX  PYg. h
Remark 1. Lemmas 1–3 show that knowing marginals of independent random variables does not determine, in general,
their joint description uniquely. For example, consider two independent random variables nX and nY with marginals
PX ¼ PðghXiÞ and PY ¼ P ghYi
 
. Then any joint set P 2 SprðX  YÞ such that fPX  PY jPX 2 MprðXÞ; PY 2 MprðYÞg#
P#MprðX  YÞ implies independence of nX and nY .
Consider further how the deﬁnition of the full independence is related to marginal and epistemic independence.
Lemma 4. Let random variables nX and nY be jointly described by a set P 2 SprðX  YÞ. Then nY is marginally irrelevant to nX iff for
any P1 2 PX and P2 2 PY there exists P 2 P such that P1 ¼ PX and P2 ¼ PY .us mention, for the sake of clarity, that we use in this paper the regular conditioning, i.e. only events with non-zero probabilities are conditioned.
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P 2 P such that P1 ¼ PX , i.e. a probability measure with the desirable properties exists.
Vice versa, assume that for any P1 2 PX and P2 2 PY there exists P 2 P such that P1 ¼ PX and P2 ¼ PY . Then obviously
PjPY
 
X ¼ PX for any PY 2 PY . h
Remark 2. Lemma 4 obviously implies that the relation of the marginal irrelevance is symmetric, i.e. the marginal indepen-
dence follows from the marginal irrelevance.
Lemma 5. Let random variables nX and nY be jointly described by a credal set P 2 CrðX  YÞ and let nY be marginally and episte-
mically irrelevant to nX. Then fPX  PY jPX 2 PX ; PY 2 PYg#P.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary extreme point P1 2 PX of the credal set PX and any P2 2 PY . Show that P1  P2 2 P. On one hand,
the condition of the marginal independence implies that there is a probability measure P 2 P such that PX ¼ P1 and PY ¼ P2.
On the other hand, the condition of the epistemic irrelevance implies that PX ¼
P
y2YPY ðfygÞPjy, where all Pjy 2 PX . Because PX
is an extreme point of PX ; Pjy ¼ PX for all y 2 Y . This means that P1  P2 ¼ PX  PY 2 P. Let us show that PX  PY 2 P for
any PX 2 PX and PY 2 PY . By deﬁnition, a credal set PX has a ﬁnite number of extreme points. Let these points be enumerated
as P1; . . . ; Pm 2 PX , then any PX 2 PX can be represented as a convex sum of these points, i.e. PX ¼
Pm
i¼1aiPi, where
Pm
i¼1ai ¼ 1
and ai P 1; i ¼ 1; . . . ;m. Taking in account that Pi  PY 2 PX ; i ¼ 1; . . . ;m, we get PX  PY ¼ ð
Pm
i¼1aiPiÞ  PY ¼
Pm
i¼1aiPi
PY 2 P. h
Proposition 2. Let random variables nX and nY be jointly described by a credal set P 2 SprðX  YÞ. Then nY is fully irrelevant to nX
iff nY is marginally and epistemically irrelevant to nX.
Proof. Obviously, the full irrelevance implies the marginal and epistemic irrelevance. Assume that nY is marginally and epi-
stemically irrelevant to nX . Then obviously PjPY ;y#PX and ðPjPY ÞX #PX for all PY 2 PY and y 2 Y if PYðfygÞ > 0, and by Lemma 5,
fPX  PY jPX 2 PX ; PY 2 PYg#P, i.e. for such PY and y we have PjPY ;y ¼ ðPjPY ÞX ¼ PX . h
The following example shows that the marginal or full independence is not generally fulﬁlled under the epistemic
independence.
Example 1. Let P ¼ fP1  P3; P2  P4g; P1; P2 2 SprðXÞ; P3; P4 2 SprðYÞ, and also P3ðyÞ > 0; P4ðyÞ > 0 for any y 2 Y;
P1ðxÞ > 0; P2ðxÞ > 0 for any x 2 X; P1 – P2 and P3 – P4. Then Pjy ¼ PX ¼ fP1; P2g for all y 2 Y and Pjx ¼ PY ¼ fP3; P4g for all
x 2 X, i.e. the condition of the epistemic independence is fulﬁlled. However, the condition of the full independence is not
valid, because, in particular, PjP3 ;y ¼ fP1g– PX for y 2 Y .
Now we turn to the inverse problem. Consider a pair of random variables hnX ; nYi with values in X and Y, respectively.
Given their marginals sets, PX 2 SprðXÞ and PY 2 SprðYÞ, how to deﬁne their joint description, P 2 SprðX  YÞ, under the
assumption that they are independent? To deal with this problem, we begin by proving the following auxiliary lemma.
Lemma 6. Let nðkÞX ; n
ðkÞ
Y ; k ¼ 1;2, be two pairs of independent random variables with their joint descriptions
Pk 2 SprðX  YÞ; k ¼ 1;2, such that ðPkÞX ¼ PX ; ðPkÞY ¼ PY ; k ¼ 1;2. Then random variables nX ; nY with their joint P ¼ P1 [ P2
are also independent.
Proof. Since nðkÞX ; n
ðkÞ
Y ; k ¼ 1;2, are independent random variables, ðPkÞjPY ;y ¼ ððPkÞjPY ÞX ¼ PX for any PY 2 PY and y 2 Y with
PYðfygÞ > 0 by deﬁnition. Clearly, ððP1 [ P2ÞjPY ÞX ¼ ððP1ÞjPY ÞX [ ððP2ÞjPY ÞX ¼ PX; ðP1 [ P2ÞjPY ;y ¼ ðP1ÞjPY ;y [ ðP2ÞjPY ;y ¼ PX , which
implies that nX ; nY are independent random variables. h
Proposition 3. Let nX and nY be independent random variables with values in X and Y, respectively, and marginals PX 2 SprðXÞ and
PY 2 SprðYÞ. Let SðnX ; nYÞ# SprðX  YÞ denote the set of all possible joint descriptions of nX and nY . Then Pmax ¼
S
Pk2SðnX ;nY ÞPk is in
SðnX ; nY Þ and
Pmax ¼ fP 2 MprðX  YÞj 8x 2 X : Pjx; PY 2 PY ;8y 2 Y : Pjy; PX 2 PXg: ð1ÞProof. By Lemma 1 the set SðnX ; nYÞ is not empty. Therefore, the fact that Pmax 2 SðnX ; nYÞ is a direct corollary of Lemma 6. The
truth of formula (1) is also evident, because, for any P 2 SðnX ; nYÞ and P 2 P, we have Pjx; PY 2 PY and Pjy; PX 2 PX for all x 2 X
and y 2 Y with PXðfxgÞ – 0 and PYðfygÞ– 0 by deﬁnition, i.e. the right side of (1) gives us the largest set of this type. h
In view of the maximum uncertainty principle, in case of independent random variables with marginals PX 2 SprðXÞ and
PY 2 SprðYÞ, we should choose as their joint description the largest possible set of probability measures, i.e. Pmax in Proposi-
tion 3. Let this set be called the product of PX 2 SprðXÞ and PY 2 SprðYÞ and denoted by PX  PY .
By analogy, we can deﬁne products for other types of independence. For example, the marginal independence implies the
following product PX N PY ¼ fP 2 MprðX  YÞjPX 2 PX ; PY 2 PYg. We can also form the largest set P 2 SprðX  YÞ if we know
that ‘‘nY is irrelevant to nX” and marginals PX 2 SprðXÞ and PY 2 SprðYÞ of P, i.e. it is not necessary that ‘‘nX is irrelevant to
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Y : Pjy; PX 2 PXg. This set P is denoted below by PX I PY .
Remark 3. Observe that if PX and PY are credal sets, then the conditions PX 2 PX and PY 2 PY follow from the conditions
Pjy 2 PX for all y 2 Y with PY ðfygÞ > 0 and Pjx 2 PY for all x 2 X with PXðfxgÞ > 0. Therefore, in this case PX  PY coincides with
the epistemic independent extension and PX I PY with the natural extension under the epistemic irrelevance.
Lemma 7. Let PX 2 CrðXÞ and PY 2 CrðYÞ. Then PX  PY 2 CrðX  YÞ.
Proof. Let X ¼ fx1; . . . ; xng;Y ¼ fy1; . . . ; ymg;PX 2 CrðXÞ and PY 2 CrðYÞ. Then these sets of probability measures can be
described by a ﬁnite system of linear inequalities asPXðfxigÞP 0; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n;Pn
i¼1
PXðfxigÞ ¼ 1;
Pn
i¼1
aijPXðfxigÞP cj; j ¼ 1; . . . ;N;
8>>><>>>:
PYðfyigÞP 0; i ¼ 1; . . . ;m;Pm
i¼1
PYðfyigÞ ¼ 1;Pm
i¼1
bijPYðfyigÞP dj; j ¼ 1; . . . ;M;
8>>><>>>:
where coefﬁcients aij; cj; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n; j ¼ 1; . . . ;N, and bij; dj; i ¼ 1; . . . ;m; j ¼ 1; . . . ;M, describe the geometrical structure of
credal sets PX 2 CrðXÞ and PY 2 CrðYÞ, and PX 2 PX ; PY 2 PY iff the corresponding systems of inequalities are fulﬁlled. Consider
now conditions when P 2 PX  PY . We see thatPjyk ðfxlgÞ ¼ Pðfðxl; ykÞgÞ
,Xn
i¼1
ðfðxi; ykÞgÞ:
Pjxk ðfylgÞ ¼ Pðfðxk; ylÞgÞ
,Xn
i¼1
Pðfðxk; yiÞgÞ:Therefore, P 2 PX  PY iff the following system of inequalities holds:
Pðfðxi; yjÞgÞP 0; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n; j ¼ 1; . . . ;m;Pn
i¼1
Pm
j¼1
Pðfðxi; yjÞgÞ ¼ 1;
Pn
i¼1
aijPðfðxi; ykÞgÞP cj
Pn
i¼1
Pðfðxi; ykÞgÞ; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m; j ¼ 1; . . . ;N;Pm
i¼1
bijPðfðxk; yiÞgÞP dj
Pm
i¼1
Pðfðxk; yiÞgÞ; k ¼ 1; . . . ;n; j ¼ 1; . . . ;M:
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
Therefore, the set of probability measures PX  PY is described by a ﬁnite system of inequalities, i.e. PX  PY 2 CrðX  YÞ. h
It is easy to see that the product PX  PY is difﬁcult to compute. Another product, usually referred in the literature as
strong independence, is much easier to compute. Let PX 2 CrðXÞ and PY 2 CrðYÞ. Then a credal set in CrðX  YÞ, being a convex
closure of the set fPX  PY jPX 2 PX ; PY 2 PYg describes strong independence of credal sets PX and PY . We denote this product by
PX S PY . Let ExðPÞ be the set of all extreme points of a credal set P. Then clearly the product PX S PY is a convex hull of the
set fPX  PY jPX 2 ExðPXÞ; PY 2 ExðPY Þg. By Lemma 5, product PX S PY can be considered as an approximation of product
PX  PY . It is easy to see that nX and nY are independent random variables if their joint distribution is represented through
marginals PX 2 CrðXÞ;PY 2 CrðYÞ by PX S PY . Moreover, we can exactly describe by ‘‘S” what is the meaning of full irrele-
vance and independence for credal sets.
Proposition 4. Let random variables nX and nY be described by a credal set P 2 CrðX  YÞ. Then
(i) nY is irrelevant to nX iff PX S PY #P#PX I PY ;
(ii) nX and nY are independent iff PX S PY #P#PX  PY .We give this proposition without proof, because it is the straightforward corollary from Lemma 5 and Proposition 2.
Let us also consider the so-called Möbius product, which can be deﬁned on the set of belief functions. Let l 2 MbelðXÞ.
Then such a l can be associated with a random value, n, taking its values in 2X such that Prðn ¼ AÞ ¼ mðAÞ, where A 2 2X
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its projections on X and Y, respectively. Then PrðnX ¼ AÞ ¼ PrfprXn ¼ Ag;PrðnY ¼ BÞ ¼ PrfprYn ¼ Bg, where A 2 2X ;B 2 2Y and
prXn; prYn are projections of the random value n on X and Y, respectively. That is, for any C 2 2XY ; prXC ¼ fx 2 Xj9ðx; yÞ 2 Cg
and prYC ¼ fy 2 Yj9ðx; yÞ 2 Cg.
Lemma 8. Let n be a random value with values in 2XY . Then random values nX and nY are independent if
PrðnX ¼ AÞPrðnY ¼ BÞ ¼ PrfprXn ¼ A; prYn ¼ Bg for any A 2 2X and B 2 2Y .
We give this lemma without a proof, because it is a straightforward corollary of the deﬁnition from the classical proba-
bility theory. Further we look at this lemma through corresponding belief functions and their Möbius transforms. Let n be
described by l. Then clearly marginals lX and lY describe random values nX and nY . Let m;mX ;mY denote, respectively,
Möbius transforms of l;lX ;lY . Then probabilities PrðnX ¼ AÞ; PrðnY ¼ BÞ; PrfprXn ¼ A; prYn ¼ Bg are computed byPrðnX ¼ AÞ ¼ mXðAÞ ¼
X
C22XY jprXC¼A
mðCÞ;
PrðnY ¼ BÞ ¼ mYðBÞ ¼
X
C22XY jprXC¼B
mðCÞ;
PrfprXn ¼ A; prYn ¼ Bg ¼
X
C22XY jprXC¼A;prY C¼B
m ðCÞ:Introduce into consideration an auxiliary set functionm on 2XY deﬁned bymðCÞ ¼ PrfprXn ¼ A; prYn ¼ Bg if C 2 2XY can be
represented as C ¼ A B for some sets A 2 2X and B 2 2Y , and mðCÞ ¼ 0 otherwise. Then the independence condition is ful-
ﬁlled ifmðA BÞ ¼ mXðAÞmYðBÞ for all A 2 2X and B 2 2Y . Notice thatm can be conceived as the Möbius transform of a belief
function l deﬁned by l ¼PC22XmðCÞghCi. It is clear that l 6 l and random values nX and nY have the same joint proba-
bility distribution as random values nX and n

Y , which correspond to belief function l.
Let us turn to the inverse problem. How to deﬁne a random value n, taking its values in 2XY , if we know the descriptions
of its projections nX and nY , and assume that random values nX and nY are independent. From the above conclusions we know
that n is not deﬁned uniquely and, using the maximum uncertainty principle, we have to choose the most imprecise descrip-
tion of n. It is fulﬁlled if we choose Prfn ¼ A Bg ¼ PrfnX ¼ AgPrfnY ¼ Ag. Such a choice of n(or l) is called Möbius product of
belief functions, and it is deﬁned as lX M lY ¼
P
A22X
P
B22YmXðAÞmYðBÞghABi, where lX ¼
P
A22X mXðAÞghAi and
lY ¼
P
B22YmYðBÞghBi. We can also write PX M PY assuming that PX ¼ PðlXÞ for some lX 2 MbelðXÞ;PY ¼ PðlYÞ for some
lY 2 MbelðYÞ and PX M PY ¼ PðlX M lYÞ.
Some connections among the introduced products are stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Let PX 2 SprðXÞ and PY 2 SprðYÞ. Then
(1) PX  PY ¼ PX S PY ¼ PX M PY ¼ PX N PY if PX ¼ PðghAiÞ for A 2 2X n ;;PY ¼ PðghBiÞ for B 2 2Y n ;;
(2) PX  PY ¼ PX S PY if PX 2 CrðXÞ and PY ¼ fPYg for PY 2 MprðYÞ;
(3) PX M PY ¼ PX N PY if PX ¼ PðghAiÞ for A 2 2X n ;;PY ¼ PðlYÞ for lY 2 MbelðYÞ;
(4) PX S PY #PX  PY #PX N PY for PX 2 CrðXÞ and PY 2 CrðYÞ;
(5) PX S PY #PX M PY #PX N PY , where PX ¼ PðlXÞ and PY ¼ PðlY Þ for lX 2 MbelðXÞ and lY 2 MbelðYÞ.Proof
(1) It is sufﬁcient to prove that each of these products is equal to PðghABiÞ. ghAi M ghBi ¼ ghABi by deﬁnition. We see that
extreme points of PðghAiÞ are ghfxgi; x 2 A; extreme points of PðghBiÞ are ghfygi; y 2 B; ghfxgi  ghfygi ¼ ghfðx;yÞgi as product of
probability measures; extreme points of P ghABi
 
are ghfðx;yÞgi, where ðx; yÞ 2 A B. This implies that PX S PY ¼
PðghABiÞ. PX N PY ¼ PðghABiÞ follows from 3). PX  PY ¼ PðghABiÞ follows from the fact that the credal set PðghABiÞ
deﬁnes independent random variables with marginals PðghAiÞ and PðghBiÞ by Lemma 2, and the inclusion
PX  PY #PX N PY (see statement 4) of the proposition).
(2) Let PX 2 CrðXÞ and PY ¼ fPYg for PY 2 MprðYÞ. Then PX  PY ¼ fPX  PY jPX 2 PXg by Lemma 6. If Pð1ÞX ; Pð2ÞX 2 PX and
a 2 ½0;1, then ðaPð1ÞX þ ð1 aÞPð2ÞX Þ  PY ¼ aPð1ÞX  PY þ ð1 aÞPð2ÞX  PY , i.e. PX  PY 2 CrðX  YÞ and, therefore,
PX  PY ¼ PX S PY .
(3) This statement follows from Lemma 9 (see Section 6).
(4) This statement obviously follows from deﬁnitions and Lemma 7.
(5) It is obvious that PX M PY #PX N PY , because of the deﬁnition of N . Let us show that PXSPY #PXMPY if PX ¼
PðlXÞ;PY ¼ PðlY Þ, where lX 2 MbelðXÞ and lY 2 MbelðYÞ. We prove this fact using additivity of Möbius product w.r.t.
convex sum, i.e. for any lð1ÞX ;l
ð2Þ
X 2 MbelðXÞ;lY 2 MbelðYÞ and a 2 ½0;1 we have ðalð1ÞX þ ð1 aÞlð2ÞX ÞMlY ¼
alð1ÞX MlY þ ð1 aÞlð2ÞX MlY , and the analogous property of subadditivity for S: ðaPð1ÞX þ ð1 aÞPð2ÞX ÞSPY #
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checked. Therefore, we prove the second property. Let P be an extreme point of ðaPð1ÞX þ ð1 aÞPð2ÞX Þ  PY . Then using
deﬁnitions of a convex sum and a product, we conclude that P ¼ ðaPð1ÞX þ ð1 aÞPð2ÞX Þ  PY , where Pð1ÞX ; Pð2ÞX , and PY are
extreme points of Pð1ÞX ;P
ð2Þ
X , and PY , respectively. We see that P ¼ aPð1ÞX  PY þ ð1 aÞPð2ÞX  PY 2 aPð1ÞX SPYþ
ð1 aÞPð2ÞX SPY . Therefore, ðaPð1ÞX þ ð1 aÞPð2ÞX ÞSPY # aPð1ÞX SPY þ ð1 aÞPð2ÞX SPY is true. Let lX ¼
P
A22XmXðAÞghAi
and lY ¼
P
B22YmYðBÞghBi. ThenPðlXÞSPðlYÞ ¼
X
A22X
mXðAÞPðghAiÞ
0@ 1AS X
B22Y
mYðBÞPðghBiÞ
0@ 1A# X
A22X
X
B22Y
mXðAÞmY ðBÞPðghABiÞ ¼ PðlXMlYÞ:
i.e. (5) is true. h6. Harmanec’s axioms for a total uncertainty measure on Mbel in a view of uncertainty invariance principle
To facilitate our discussion of total uncertainty measures, we reformulate here in an equivalent form the axioms intro-
duced for total uncertainty measures on Mbel by Harmanec [4]. This allows us to further reformulate them for credal sets.
R0. Functionality. A measure of total uncertainty is a functional UT : Mbel ! ½0;þ1Þ.
R1. Label independency. Let X;Y be ﬁnite nonempty sets and u : X ! Y be a bijection. Then UTðluÞ ¼ UTðlÞ for any
l 2 MbelðXÞ.
If we take X ¼ Y in this axiom, then we obtain the Symmetry Axiom, as formulated by Harmanec [4].
R2. Continuity. Let l 2 MbelðXÞ;m be the Möbius transform of l. Then the function f ðxÞ ¼ UTðl xghAi þ xghBiÞ, which is
deﬁned for arbitrary nonempty sets A; B 2 2X and any x 2 ½mðBÞ;mðAÞ, is continuous on ½mðBÞ;mðAÞ.
R3. Expansibility. Let X and Y be ﬁnite nonempty sets, X  Y , and u : X ! Y be an injection, deﬁned by uðxÞ ¼ x for all
x 2 X. Then UTðluÞ ¼ UTðlÞ for any l 2 MbelðXÞ.
R4. Subadditivity. Let l 2 MbelðX  YÞ, then UTðlXÞ þ UTðlYÞP UTðlÞ.
R5. Additivity. Let lX 2 MbelðXÞ;lY 2 MbelðYÞ, and let l 2 MbelðX  YÞ be the Möbius product of lX and lY . Then
UTðlXÞ þ UTðlYÞ ¼ UTðlÞ.
R6. Monotone dispensability. Let l 2 MbelðXÞ and m be the Möbius transform of l. If m 2 MbelðXÞ can be represented as
m ¼PA22Xn;mðAÞlA, where lA 2 MbelðXÞ and lA 6 ghAi for all A 2 2X n ;, then UTðlÞ 6 UTðmÞ.
R7. Probabilistic normalization. If X ¼ fx1; x2g; P 2 MprðXÞ, and Pðfx1gÞ ¼ Pðfx2gÞ ¼ 0:5. Then UTðPÞ ¼ 1.
R8. Nonspeciﬁcity normalization. If X ¼ fx1; x2g, then UTðghXiÞ ¼ 1.
Axioms R7 and R8 need some explanation. According to these axioms, the amount of uncertainty is the same when we
have no information about alternatives in set X or when our claims about alternatives are uniformly distributed. It seems
that a more ﬂexible normalization requirement is to deﬁne UTðghXiÞ ¼ a;UTðPÞ ¼ b, where a; b are positive real numbers, such
that aP b due to Axiom R6.
To extend the axioms to credal sets, we can use the equivalent operations on credal sets and generalize Axioms R0, R1, R3,
R4, R7, and R8 as follows:
R0c. Functionality. A measure of total uncertainty is a functional UT : Cr ! ½0;þ1Þ.
R1c. Label independency. Let X;Y be ﬁnite nonempty sets and let u : X ! Y be a bijection. Then, UTðPuÞ ¼ UTðPÞ for any
P 2 CrðXÞ.
R3c. Expansibility. Let X;Y be ﬁnite nonempty sets, X  Y , and u : X ! Y be an injection deﬁned by uðxÞ ¼ x for all x 2 X.
Then, UTðPuÞ ¼ UTðPÞ for any P 2 CrðXÞ.
R4c. Subadditivity. Let P 2 CrðX  YÞ. Then UTðPXÞ þ UTðPYÞP UTðPÞ.
R7c. Probabilistic normalization. If X ¼ fx1; x2g; P 2 MprðXÞ, and Pðfx1gÞ ¼ Pðfx2gÞ ¼ 0:5. Then UTðfPgÞ ¼ 1.
R8c. Nonspeciﬁcity normalization. If X ¼ fx1; x2g, then UTðPðghXiÞÞ ¼ 1.
Let us discuss why it is problematic to generalize the remaining axioms. Axiom R2 (continuity) was introduced for tech-
nical reasons. It is one of possible requirements for proving uniqueness of a total uncertainty measure (Shannon entropy) on
the set of probability measures. The direct generalization of R2 requires that the Möbius transform be generalized to credal
sets, which seems to be impossible. We encounter a similar problem with generalizing the Möbius product, which is used in
R5, to credal sets. Further study is thus needed to answer the question whether Axioms R2 and R5 can be extended to credal
sets. The following lemma shows an interpretation of the Möbius product through credal sets if one of the factors is a {0,1}-
valued belief function.
Lemma 9. Let X;Y be ﬁnite sets, let mX be the Möbius transform of lX 2 M2monðXÞ, and let lon 2XY be deﬁned by
l ¼PB22XmXðBÞghBYi. Then
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B22X jBY#A
lXðBÞ;A 2 2XY ;
(2) l 2 M2monðX  YÞ;
(3) PðlÞ ¼ fP 2 MprðX  YÞjPX P lXg.Proof
(1) Let l ¼PB22XmXðBÞghBYi. Then
lðAÞ ¼
X
B22X jBY #A
mXðBÞ ¼ sup
B22X jBY #A
lXðBÞ;
so (1) is proved.(2) It is well-known [34], that such an extension of 2-monotone measure from one algebra (here 2X) to another algebra
(here 2XY ) by Eq. (1) gives us also a 2-monotone measure, so (2) is also true.
(3) We see that lX ¼ lX and, therefore, PðlÞ# fP 2 MprðX  YÞjPX P lXg. On the other hand, let P 2 MprðX  YÞ and
PX P lX . Then
lðAÞ ¼ sup
B22X jBY #A
lXðBÞ 6 sup
B22X jBY #A
PXðBÞ 6 PðAÞ;
where A 2 2XY , i.e. PðlÞ  fP 2 MprðX  YÞjPX P lXg, i.e. (3) is also proved. h
It easy to see that l can be conceived as the Möbius product of lX and ghYi at least when lX 2 MbelðXÞ. Lemma 9 says that
the largest credal set with marginals PðlXÞ and PðghYiÞ can be calculated through the Möbius product of lX and ghYi. It seems
that we have two types of independence for general theories of imprecise probabilities. The ﬁrst type is inherited from prob-
ability theory, where uncertainty is represented in terms of pure conﬂict. The second one is inherited from possibility theory,
where uncertainty is expressed in a conﬂict-free manner. It is thus reasonable to deﬁne products of different types, for exam-
ple, those that deﬁned in Section 5. The product PXSPY , which is known as strong independence of PX 2 CrðXÞ and
PY 2 CrðYÞ, reﬂects independence as is understood in probability theory. On the other hand, the product PX N PY is the gen-
eralization of the product in possibility theory. In Lemma 9, we use a special product, where PX 2 PðlXÞ;lX 2 M2monðXÞ, and
PY ¼ PðghYiÞ. In some sense, the Möbius product is associated with independence of both types.
There are also problems of extending Axiom R6 to credal sets. This can be overcome, in our opinion, by replacing Axiom
R6 with the following stronger axiom.
R10. Strong monotone dispensability. Let l; m 2 MbelðXÞ and lP m. Then UTðlÞ 6 UTðmÞ.
Due to Proposition 1, this axiom can be equivalently reformulated for credal sets in the following way.
R10c. Strong monotone dispensability. Let P1;P2 2 CrðXÞ and P1#P2. Then UTðP1Þ 6 UTðP2Þ.
If l; m 2 MbelðXÞ obey Axiom R6, then clearly lP m. However, the inverse conclusion is not true, as demonstrated by the
following example.Example 2. Let l; m 2 MbelðXÞ, where X ¼ fx1; x2; x3g, be deﬁned as l ¼ 12ghXi þ 16ghfx1gi þ 16ghfx2gi þ 16ghfx3gi and
m ¼ 13ghfx1 ;x2gi þ 13ghfx1;x3gi þ 13ghfx2 ;x3gi.
It is easy to check lP m. However, m cannot be represented in the form m ¼PA22Xn;mðAÞlA, where lA 2 MbelðXÞ;lA 6 ghAi
for all A 2 2X n ;, and m is the Möbius transform of l.7. New system of axioms for uncertainty measures on belief functions
The aim of this section is to examine, in the most comprehensive way, possible axiomatic requirements for the various
measures of uncertainty that pertain to imprecise probabilities. This means that we consider, in addition to the traditional
axiomatic requirements [3], some new ones that may help us to clarify various issues regarding the total (or aggregate)
uncertainty and its various disaggregations. We attempt to fully justify each of the new requirements that we consider as
axioms.
We deﬁne uncertainty measures on special subsets of monotone measures or on credal sets. A measure of uncertainty is a
functional U : Cr ! ½0;1Þ. This functional can be considered on the set of all lower probability measures. To do this, for any
such measure l on 2X we construct the credal set PðlÞ ¼ fP 2 MprðXÞjP P lg, and assume that UðlÞ ¼ UðPðlÞÞ. For conve-
nience, we introduce the following notation: UT denotes a measure of total (aggregate) uncertainty; UN denotes a measure of
nonspeciﬁcity; and UC denotes a measure of conﬂict.
In this section, we assume that credal sets are described by belief functions. That is, uncertainty measures are represented
as functionals on Mbel.
Axiom 1. Let l 2 MbelðXÞ. Then UNðlÞ ¼ 0 if l 2 MprðXÞ and UCðlÞ ¼ 0 if l ¼ ghBi;B 2 2X n ;.
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for any l 2 MbelðXÞ.
This axiom can be considered as a combination of the label independency, symmetry, and expansibility axioms in [4].
Actually, let u : X ! Y be an injection. Denoting by Z ¼ uðXÞ, introduce into consideration the following mappings
u1 : X ! Z;u2 : Z ! Y by u1ðxÞ ¼ uðxÞ for any x 2 X, and u2ðyÞ ¼ y for any y 2 Z. Then u ¼ u1 	u2. Notice that u1 is a bijec-
tion, and u2 is an injection of a special type.
Consider a set X of alternatives whose occurrence is described by l 2 MbelðXÞ, and assume that we have also the following
additional information: there is a partition fX1; . . . ;Xmg of X such that if the true alternative belongs to set Xi then yi 2 Xi is
the true alternative. This information can be described by a mapping u : X ! Y;Y #X, deﬁned by uðxÞ ¼ yi if x 2 Xi. After
combining these two sources of information, we get a measure lu. Since the additional information reduces uncertainty,
we get the following axiom.
Axiom 3. Let l 2 MbelðXÞ;Y#X, and u : X ! Y with uðxÞ 2 u1ðuðxÞÞ for any x 2 X. Then UTðlÞP UTðluÞ.
Axiom 4. If l1;l2 2 MbelðXÞ and l1 6 l2, then UNðl1ÞP UNðl2Þ and UTðl1ÞP UTðl2Þ.
We see that Pðl1Þ  Pðl2Þ in this case and the amount of uncertainty increases if we consider larger set of probability
measures. This axiom can be considered as an analog of the monotone dispensability axiom in [4]. In Section 6, we call it
the strong monotone dispensability axiom.
Axiom 5. Let l ¼ lXMlY , where lX 2 MbelðXÞ;lY 2 MbelðYÞ, and lX ¼ ghAi for some A#X. Then UTðlÞ ¼ UTðlXÞ þ UTðlY Þ.
This axiom can be viewed as a particular case of additivity axiom in [4] or R5 from Section 6.
The next axiom is chosen as an analog of the well-known property of the Shannon entropy. Let nX and nY be random vari-
ables with values in X and Y respectively. Then SðnX ; nYÞ ¼ SðnX jnYÞ þ SðnYÞ, where SðnX jnY Þ is a conditional entropy for a given
nY . Let us express the above property through probability measures. Assume that the joint probability distribution of ðnX ; nY Þ
is described by a probability measure P 2 MprðX  YÞ. Then, we compute the conditional probability measures Pjy, where
y 2 Y , by the usual formula PjyðAÞ ¼ PðA fygÞ=PYðfygÞ;A 2 2X . ThenSðPÞ ¼
X
y2Y
PYðfygÞSðPjyÞ þ SðPY Þ:Notice that in the last formula it does not matter if PYðfygÞ ¼ 0, since we suppose that in this case PYðfygÞSðPjyÞ ¼ 0. In the
next axiomwe assume that the above property is fulﬁlled for an arbitrary random variable nX with imprecise description and
usual random variable nY with exact description.
Axiom 6. Let l 2 MbelðX  YÞ and lY 2 MprðYÞ. Then
UTðlÞ ¼
X
y2Y
lY ðfygÞUTðljyÞ þ UTðlYÞ;where ljyðAÞ ¼ lðAfygÞlY ðfygÞ ;A 2 2
X .
Axiom 7. Let l 2 MbelðX  YÞ. Then UTðlÞ 6 UTðlXÞ þ UTðlYÞ (the subadditivity axiom).
Axiom 8. UCðlÞ þ UNðlÞ ¼ UTðlÞ for any l 2 Mbel.
Corollary 1. Let l 2 MbelðXÞ and X#Y. Consider l0 2 MbelðYÞ deﬁned by l0ðAÞ ¼ lðA \ XÞ, where A 2 2Y . Then
UTðlÞ ¼ UTðl0Þ;UNðlÞ ¼ UNðl0Þ;UCðlÞ ¼ UCðl0Þ.
Proof. Let u : X ! Y be such that uðxÞ ¼ x; x 2 X. It is clear that u is an injection and lu ¼ l0. Therefore, UTðlÞ ¼ UTðl0Þ by
Axiom 2. h
In the following, we identify belief functions l and l0 introduced in Corollary 1. This allows us, for example, to consider
the convex sum l ¼ al1 þ ð1 aÞl2; a 2 ½0;1, of l1 2 MbelðXÞ and l2 2 MbelðYÞ, where X – Y . Then we can extend li; i ¼ 1;2,
to belief functions l0i 2 MbelðX [ YÞ like in Corollary 1, and assume that l 2 MbelðX [ YÞ and l ¼ al01 þ ð1 aÞl02.
Corollary 2. Let u : X ! Y be a mapping. Then UTðluÞ 6 UTðlÞ for any l 2 MbelðXÞ.
Proof. To prove the statement, we represent u as a composition u ¼ u1 	u2 of two mappings u1 : X ! Z; Z#X, and
u2 : Z ! Y , where u1 is chosen such that u1ðxÞ 2 u1ðuðxÞÞ; x 2 X, and u2ðxÞ ¼ uðxÞ; x 2 Z. We see that UTðlu1 Þ 6 UTðlÞ
by Axiom 3. Since u2 is an injection, UTðlu1 Þ ¼ UTðluÞ by Axiom 2. Hence, UTðluÞ 6 UTðlÞ. h
Remark 4. Corollary 2 may be viewed as Axiom 3 in a simpler form.
Corollary 3. Let l1;l2 2 MbelðXÞ;l ¼ al1 þ ð1 aÞl2 for a 2 ½0;1. Then aUTðl1Þ þ ð1 aÞUTðl2Þ 6 UTðlÞ.
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ð1 aÞl2ðBÞ; A;B 2 2X . Then l0X ¼ l; l0Y 2 MprðYÞ and l0Yðfy1gÞ ¼ a; l0Yðfy2gÞ ¼ 1 a, andUTðl0Þ ¼ aUTðl1Þ þ ð1 aÞUTðl2Þ þ UT l0Y
 by Axiom 6. On the other hand,UTðl0Þ 6 UT l0X
 þ UT l0Y by Axiom 7. Therefore, UTðlÞP aUTðl1Þ þ ð1 aÞUTðl2Þ. h
Now we introduce Axiom 6* that can equivalently replace Axiom 6.
Axiom 6*. Let l ¼Pmk¼1aklk, where lk 2 MbelðXkÞ; ak P 0; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m;Pmk¼1ak ¼ 1, and Xk; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m, be pairwise disjoint
ﬁnite nonempty sets, i.e. fXkgmk¼1 is a partition of X ¼
Sm
k¼1Xk. Then UTðlÞ ¼
Pm
k¼1akUTðlkÞ þ UTðluÞ, where
u : X ! fX1; . . . ;Xmg is such that uðxÞ ¼ Xk if x 2 Xk.
Corollary 4. We can equivalently replace Axiom 6 with Axiom 6* in the system of axioms.
Proof. We show ﬁrst that Axiom 6* follows from the introduced axioms. Let Y ¼ fX1; . . . ;Xmg and l0 2 MbelðX  YÞ deﬁned by
l0
Sm
k¼1Ak  fXkg
  ¼Pmk¼1aklkðAkÞ; Ak 2 2X . Then l0Y 2 MprðYÞ;l0Y ðfXkgÞ ¼ ak, and l0jXk ¼ lk; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m. That is,
UTðl0Þ ¼
Pm
k¼1akUTðlkÞ þ UT l0Y
 
by Axiom 6. Notice that l0Y ¼ lu and l0 ¼ lw, where w : X ! X  Y is an injection, deﬁned
by wðxÞ ¼ ðx; fXkgÞ if x 2 Xk. Therefore, UTðl0Þ ¼ UTðlÞ by Axiom 2 and, consequently, Axiom 6* follows from Axioms 2 and 6.
Next, we show that Axioms 2 and 6* imply Axiom 6. Let l 2 MbelðX  YÞ;Y ¼ fy1; . . . ; ymg;lY 2 MprðYÞ; thenl
[
yk2Y
Ak  fykg
 !
¼
Xm
k¼1
lY ðfykgÞljyk ðAkÞ:Consider now set functions lk 2 MbelðX  YÞ; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m, deﬁned by lkðAÞ ¼ ljyk ðA \XkÞ, where Xk ¼ X  fykg. We see that
lk together with the partition fX1; . . . ;Xmg of X  Y obey the conditions of Axiom 6* and in this case lu ¼ lY . Therefore,
UTðlÞ ¼
Pm
k¼1lYðfykgÞUTðlkÞ þ UTðluÞ. After that we consider injections wk : X ! X  Y; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m, deﬁned by
wkðxÞ ¼ ðx; ykÞ; x 2 X. Since lwkjyk ¼ lk; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m, we get UTðl
wk
jyk Þ ¼ UTðlkÞ and UTðlÞ ¼
Pm
k¼1lYðfykgÞUTðljyk Þ þ UTðlYÞ. This
completes the proof. h
Now we introduce Axiom 7* that can equivalently replace Axiom 7, the subadditivity axiom.
Axiom 7*. Let l 2 MbelðXÞ and let partitions X ¼ fX1; . . . ;Xmg;Y ¼ fY1; . . . ;Ylg of X be chosen in such a way that
jXi \ Yjj 6 1; i ¼ 1; . . . ;m; j ¼ 1; . . . ; l. Consider mappings u : X! X;w : X! Y deﬁned by uðxÞ ¼ Xi if x 2 Xi and wðxÞ ¼ Yj
if x 2 Yj. Then UTðluÞ þ UTðlwÞP UTðlÞ.
Corollary 5. We can equivalently replace Axiom 7 with Axiom 7* in the system of axioms.
Proof. Necessity. Let us show that Axiom 7* follows from Axioms 2 and 7. Consider a mapping m : X! X  Y deﬁned by
mðxÞ ¼ ðXi;YjÞ if x 2 Xi \ Yj. It is clear that m is an injection, because jXi \ Yjj 6 1; i ¼ 1; . . . ;m; j ¼ 1; . . . ; l. Therefore,
UTðlmÞ ¼ UTðlÞ by Axiom 2. We notice further that UT lmX
 þ UT lmY P UTðlmÞ by Axiom 7, and lmX ¼ lu;lmY ¼ lw. This con-
cludes the proof of necessity.
Sufﬁciency. Let us prove that Axiom 7 follows from Axioms 2 and 7*. Let X ¼ X  Y , where X;Y are ﬁnite sets. Consider
l 2 MbelðXÞ, partitions eX ¼ ffxg  Ygx2X ; eY ¼ fX  fyggy2Y and the corresponding mappingsu : X! eX ;w : X! eY , deﬁned by
uððx; yÞÞ ¼ fxg  Y ;wððx; yÞÞ ¼ X  fyg; ðx; yÞ 2 X. Then using Axiom 7*, we get that UTðluÞ þ UTðlwÞP UTðlÞ. It remains to
consider one-to-one mappings ~u : X ! eX and ~w : Y ! eY , deﬁned by ~uðxÞ ¼ fxg  Y; x 2 X, and ~wðyÞ ¼ X  fyg; y 2 Y . Then
l ~uX ¼ lu and l
~w
Y ¼ lw. Therefore, UTðl
~u
X Þ ¼ UTðluÞ;UTðl
~w
Y Þ ¼ UTðlwÞ and UTðlXÞ þ UTðlY ÞP UTðlÞ. This completes the proof
of sufﬁciency. h
Corollary 6. Let P 2 MprðXÞ. Then UTðPÞ ¼ SðPÞ, where S is the Shannon entropy.
Proof. For the proof, we use the following axioms for the Shannon entropy [35]: (1) expansibility; (2) symmetry; (3) sub-
additivity; (4) additivity; (5) normalizing condition; and (6) the entropy is ‘‘small for small probabilities”. These axioms
deﬁne the Shannon entropy uniquely [35]. It is clear that the axioms (1), (2), and (3) are fulﬁlled, i.e. they follow from
the introduced system of axioms. Additivity axiom means that if P ¼ PX  PY , where PX 2 MprðXÞ and PY 2 MprðYÞ, then
SðPÞ ¼ SðPXÞ þ SðPY Þ. In this case, Pjy ¼ PX for any y 2 Y andUTðPÞ ¼
X
y2Y
PYðfygÞUTðPjyÞ þ UTðPY Þ ¼
X
y2Y
PY ðfygÞUTðPXÞ þ UTðPYÞ ¼ UTðPXÞ þ UTðPYÞby Axiom 6. That is, the additivity axiom is also fulﬁlled.
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P2;qðfx1gÞ ¼ q; q 2 ½0;1. Then (5) means that K2ð0:5Þ ¼ c > 0 and (6) is equivalent to the condition limq!þ0K2ðqÞ ¼ 0. As
follows from [35], axioms (1), (2), (3), and (4) imply that K2 is continuous and non-decreasing on (0,0.5]. Now we prove that
(6) follows also from the introduced system of axioms. Consider probability measures Pn 2 MprðXÞ; where X ¼ fx1; . . . ; xng;
PnðfxigÞ ¼ 1=n; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n. Then, by the additivity axiom UTðPnmÞ ¼ UTðPnÞ þ UTðPmÞ;n;m 2 N. It is easy to see that
UTðP1Þ ¼ 0 by Axiom 4. These properties together with the normalizing condition imply that UTðPnÞ ¼ clg2n;n 2 N. Consider
now probability measures Pn; Pn1; P1 2 MprðXÞ, where X ¼ fx1; . . . ; xng, PnðfxigÞ ¼ 1=n; i ¼ 1; . . . ; n, Pn1ðfxigÞ ¼ 1=ðn 1Þ;
i ¼ 1; . . . ;n 1, and P1ðfxngÞ ¼ 1. Then Pn ¼ n1n Pn1 þ 1n P1, and by Corollary 4 UTðPnÞ ¼ n1n UTðPn1Þ þ 1n UTðP1Þ þ UTðPun Þ,
where Pun 2 MprðYÞ, Y ¼ fX1;X2g;X1 ¼ fx1; . . . ; xn1g, X2 ¼ fxng. We see that Pun ðfX1gÞ ¼ n1n and Pun ðfX2gÞ ¼ 1n, i.e.
UTðPun Þ ¼ K2ð1=nÞ. Therefore,lim
n!1
K2ð1=nÞ ¼ c lim
n!1
lg2n
n 1
n
lg2ðn 1Þ
 	
¼ c lim
n!1
1
n
lg2n
n 1
n
lg2
n 1
n
 	 	
¼ 0:Taking into account that K2 is continuous and non-decreasing on (0,0.5], we get that limq!þ0K2ðqÞ ¼ 0, i.e. the functional UT
is deﬁned uniquely on MprðXÞ and coincides with the Shannon entropy. h
Corollary 7. Let l 2 MbelðXÞ and l ¼ ghAi;A 2 2X n ;. Then UTðlÞ ¼ HðlÞ, where H is the Hartley measure.
Proof. We notice ﬁrst that by Axiom 2 there is a function f : N! ½0;þ1Þ such that UTðghAiÞ ¼ f ðjAjÞ for any A#X. Let
X ¼ X  Y and A ¼ C  B. Then, by Axiom 5, UTðghAiÞ ¼ UTðghBiÞ þ UTðghCiÞ, or f ðjAjÞ ¼ f ðjBjÞ þ f ðjCjÞ. Since jAj ¼ jCjjBj we get
that f ðnmÞ ¼ f ðnÞf ðmÞ;n;m 2 N. Assume that f ð2Þ ¼ c > 0 then, taking into account that f ð1Þ ¼ 0, we see that f is deﬁned
uniquely on N, and it is expressed by f ðnÞ ¼ clg2n. That is, UTðghAiÞ ¼ clg2jAj. h
Corollary 8. Let l ¼Pmk¼1aklk, where lk 2 MbelðXÞ; ak P 0; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m;Pmk¼1ak ¼ 1, and let P 2 Mprðf1; . . . ;mgÞ be such that
PðfkgÞ ¼ ak; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m. ThenXm
k¼1
akUTðlkÞ þ UTðPÞP UTðlÞ:Proof. We show that Corollary 8 follows from Corollaries 2 and 4. Let l ¼Pmk¼1aklk, where lk 2 MbelðXÞ; ak P 0;
k ¼ 1; . . . ;m;Pmk¼1ak ¼ 1. Assume that (1) uk : Xk ! X are one-to-one mappings; (2) gk 2 MbelðXkÞ; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m, are chosen
such that gukk ¼ lk; and (3) Xk are pairwise disjoint sets. Next consider g ¼
Pm
k¼1akgk on 2
X and mappings: u : X! X with
uðxÞ ¼ ukðxÞ if x 2 Xk; w : X! f1; . . . ;mg with wðxÞ ¼ k if x 2 Xk. Then, by Corollary 4, UTðgÞ ¼
Pm
k¼1akUTðgkÞ þ UTðgwÞ,
where gw 2 Mprðf1; . . . ;mgÞ with gwðfkgÞ ¼ ak; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m. Using Axiom 2 and Corollary 2, we get that
UTðgkÞ ¼ UTðgukk Þ ¼ UTðlkÞ and UTðgÞP UTðguÞ ¼ UTðlÞ. h
Our next goal is to check that the presented system of axioms is consistent on Mbel. Let us recall that the maximum en-
tropy functional S on Mbel is deﬁned by S
ðlÞ ¼ supfSðPÞjP 2 PðlÞg, where l 2 Mbel and S is the Shannon entropy.
Proposition 6. The maximum entropy functional S obeys all axioms for UT on Mbel.
Proof. Observe that we need to prove only Axioms 2–7, because we do not consider here disaggregations of S. It easy to
check and it is well-known that S obeys Axioms 2, 4, 5, 7 for UT on Mbel. To check Axiom 3, let X; Y be ﬁnite non-empty sets
and u : X ! Y be a mapping. We should prove that SðluÞ 6 SðlÞ for l 2 MbelðXÞ. Since l is a belief measure,
fPujP P l; P 2 MprðXÞg ¼ fP 2 MprðYÞjP P lug by Proposition 1. This means that there is a P 2 MprðXÞ with l 6 P such that
SðluÞ ¼ SðPuÞ, and SðlÞP SðPÞP SðPuÞ ¼ SðluÞ.
Let us check Axiom 6*. Assume that l ¼Pmk¼1aklk, where lk 2 MbelðXÞ; ak P 0; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m;Pmk¼1ak ¼ 1, and, in addition,
there is a partition fX1; . . . ;Xmg of X such that lkðXkÞ ¼ 1; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m. We should prove that SðlÞ ¼
Pm
k¼1akS
ðlkÞ þ SðluÞ,
where u : X ! fX1; . . . ;Xmg is such that uðxÞ ¼ Xk if x 2 Xk.
Notice that, due to the additional condition, the problem of ﬁnding the probability measure P 2 MprðXÞ; P P l, with the
maximal entropy is divided on m independent optimization problems on sets Xk; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m, i.e. if SðlÞ ¼ SðPÞ with P P l,
then P ¼Pmk¼1akPk, where Pk 2 MprðXÞ; Pk P lk, and SðlkÞ ¼ SðPkÞ; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m. Since the equality to be proved is valid for
probability measures, we get that SðPÞ ¼Pmk¼1akSðPkÞ þ SðPuÞ, where Pu ¼ lu and consequently SðPuÞ ¼ SðluÞ. Thus, Axiom
6* is fulﬁlled for S. h
Nowwe check if there are some disaggregations of S onMbel obeying Axioms 1–8. Let S be the measure of conﬂict, which
is computed as minimal entropy. Then UN ¼ S  S. It is easy to check that all axioms are true, i.e. we can formulate the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 7. The disaggregation UT ¼ S; UC ¼ S; UN ¼ S  S obeys Axioms 1–8 for uncertainty measures on Mbel.
Another possible way of disaggregating S can be realized by using the generalized Hartley measure.
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Proof. It is easy to check the validity of each axiom. For example, let us check that SðlÞ  GHðlÞP 0 for l 2 MbelðXÞ. Let
l ¼PB22XmðBÞghBi. Since l 2 Mbel, the Möbius transform m of l is a non-negative set function. Therefore, SðlÞ ¼
S
P
B22Xn;mðBÞghBi
 
P
P
B22Xn;mðBÞSðghBiÞ ¼ GHðlÞ. h8. Axioms for uncertainty measures on credal sets
In this section we generalize the eight axioms for uncertainty measures from belief functions onto the set of all possible
credal sets and show that the main results introduced in Section 7 remain valid for this general case. This is possible due to
Proposition 1 and Lemma 9.
Axiom 1c. Let P 2 CrðXÞ. Then UNðPÞ ¼ 0 if P is a singleton and UCðPÞ ¼ 0 if P ¼ PðghBiÞ;B#X.
Axiom 2c. Let u : X ! Y be an injection. Then UTðPuÞ ¼ UTðPÞ; UNðPuÞ ¼ UNðPÞ; UCðPuÞ ¼ UCðPÞ for any P 2 CrðXÞ.
Due to Corollary 2, we formulate Axiom 3 for uncertainty measures on credal sets as follows.
Axiom 3c. Let X;Y be ﬁnite sets, u : X ! Y and P 2 CrðXÞ. Then UTðPÞP UTðPuÞ.
Axiom 4c. If P1;P2 2 CrðXÞ and P1  P2, then UNðP1ÞP UNðP2Þ and UTðP1ÞP UTðP2Þ.
Axiom 5c. Let X;Y be ﬁnite sets, PX ¼ PðghAiÞ;A#X, and PY 2 CrðYÞ. Consider a credal set P 2 CrðX  YÞ, deﬁned by
P ¼ PX N PY . Then UTðPÞ ¼ UTðPXÞ þ UTðPYÞ.
Axiom 6c. Let P 2 CrðX  YÞ and PY ¼ fPYg, where PY 2 MprðYÞ. Then UTðPÞ ¼
P
y2YPYðfygÞUTðPjyÞ þ UTðPY Þ, where
Pjy ¼ fPjyjP 2 Pg.
Axiom 7c. Let X;Y be ﬁnite sets and P 2 CrðX  YÞ. Then UTðPÞ 6 UTðPXÞ þ UTðPYÞ (the subadditivity axiom).
Axiom 8c. UCðPÞ þ UNðPÞ ¼ UTðPÞ;P 2 Cr.
The equivalence of Axiom 6 and 6c in the framework of belief functions follows from the following lemma.
Lemma 10. Let l 2 M2monðX  YÞ and lY 2 MprðYÞ. Consider ljy 2 M2monðXÞ deﬁned for any y 2 Y with lY ðfygÞ– 0 by2
ljyðAÞ ¼ lðA fygÞ=lY ðfygÞ;A 2 2X. Then PðljyÞ ¼ fPjyjP 2 PðlÞg.
Proof. Let l 2 M2monðX  YÞ; P 2 PðlÞ and lYðfygÞ – 0 for y 2 Y . Then ljyðAÞ ¼ lðA fygÞ=lYðfygÞ 6 PðA fygÞ=lYðfygÞ ¼
PjyðAÞ;A 2 2X , i.e. ljy 6 Pjy and fPjyjP 2 PðlÞg#PðljyÞ. We prove the opposite inclusion if we show that every extreme point
of PðljyÞ is in fPjyjP 2 PðlÞg. Each extreme point Pc of PðljyÞ is described by a complete chain c ¼ fB0;B1; . . . ;Bng of sets in 2X
with ; ¼ B0  B1  . . .  Bn ¼ X; jBi n Bi1j ¼ 1; PcðBiÞ ¼ ljyðBiÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n. Consider also the chain c0 ¼ fB0  fyg;
B1  fyg; . . . ;Bn  fygg#2XY . This chain can be extended to a complete chain c#2XY ; c0# c. We see that the probability
measure Pc 2 PðlÞ with Pc ðAÞ ¼ lðAÞ;A 2 c, satisﬁes the required condition: ðPc Þjy ¼ Pc, i.e. the lemma is proved. h
Using the same technique as in Section 7, we can show that most of results from the previous section are also valid for
uncertainty measures for credal sets. Therefore, we formulate them without proofs.
Corollary 1c. Let X;Y be ﬁnite sets, X#Y, and P 2 CrðXÞ. Consider a credal set P0 2 CrðYÞ deﬁned by2 It is
when lP0 ¼ fP0 2 MprðYÞj9P 2 P : PðAÞ ¼ P0ðAÞ;A 2 2Xg:Then UNðP0Þ ¼ UNðPÞ;UCðP0Þ ¼ UCðPÞ;UTðP0Þ ¼ UTðPÞ.
We identify credal sets P and P0 from Corollary 1c. It allows us to deﬁne, for example, the convex sum
P ¼ aP1 þ ð1 aÞP2; a 2 ½0;1, of credal sets P1 2 CrðXÞ and P2 2 CrðYÞ, where X – Y . In this case we extend Pi; i ¼ 1;2, to cre-
dal sets P0i 2 CrðX [ YÞ like in Corollary 1c, and assume that P 2 CrðX [ YÞ and P ¼ aP01 þ ð1 aÞP02.
Corollary 3c. Let P1;P2 2 CrðXÞ, and P ¼ aP1 þ ð1 aÞP2 for a 2 ½0;1. Then aUTðP1Þ þ ð1 aÞUTðP2Þ 6 UTðPÞ.
Next, Axiom 6*c can equivalently replace Axiom 6c.worth of noticing that the conditioning used in Lemma 10, namely ljyðAÞ ¼ lðAfygÞlY ðfygÞ , is a partial case of the general formula: ljyðAÞ ¼
lðAfygÞ
lðAfygþldððXnAÞfygÞÞ,
d is the dual of l, and lY is not necessarily a probability measure.
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Pm
k¼1akPk, where Pk 2 CrðXkÞ; ak P 0; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m;Pm
k¼1ak ¼ 1. Then UTðPÞ ¼
Pm
k¼1akUTðPkÞ þ UTðPuÞ, where u : X1 [ . . . [ Xm ! fX1; . . . ;Xmg is such that uðxÞ ¼ Xk if x 2 Xk.
Next, Axiom 7*c can equivalently replace Axiom 7*.
Axiom 7*c. Let P 2 CrðXÞ and let partitions of X; X ¼ fX1; . . . ;Xmg and Y ¼ fY1; . . . ;Ylg, be chosen in such a way that
jXi \ Yjj 6 1; i ¼ 1; . . . ;m; j ¼ 1; . . . ; l. Consider mappings u : X! X and w : X! Y deﬁned by uðxÞ ¼ Xi if x 2 Xi and
uðxÞ ¼ Yj if x 2 Yj. Then UTðluÞ þ UTðlwÞP UTðlÞ.
Corollary 8c. Let P ¼Pmk¼1akPk, where Pk 2 CrðXÞ; ak P 0; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m; Pmk¼1ak ¼ 1, and P 2 Mprðf1; . . . ;mgÞ such that
PðfkgÞ ¼ ak; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m. ThenXm
k¼1
akUTðPkÞ þ UTðfPgÞP UTðPÞ:Proposition 6c. The maximal entropy S obeys all axioms for UT on Cr.
Proposition 7c. The disaggregation UT ¼ S;UC ¼ S;UN ¼ S  S obeys Axioms 1c, 2c, 3c, 4c, 5c, 6c, 7c, 8c for uncertainty mea-
sures on Cr.
Summarizing all results in this section, we conclude that the presented system of axioms for uncertainty measures onMbel
can be equivalently extended to the system of axioms on Cr. As a consequence, the system of Axioms 1–8 can be formulated
in the same way also on the set of all 2-monotone measures.
9. The algebraic structure of the set of all possible total uncertainty measures on Mbel
The aim of this section is to describe the set of all possible total uncertainty measures onMbel, which obey Axioms 1–8. For
the sake of convenience, we denote this set by FðMbelÞ.
It is easy to check that FðMbelÞ is a convex cone, i.e. a functional f ¼ c1f1 þ c2f2 for any ci P 0, and for any
fi 2 FðMbelÞ; i ¼ 1;2, is also in FðMbelÞ, and f R FðMbelÞ for any f X 0 in FðMbelÞ. We consider further also normalization con-
ditions. Let X ¼ fx1; x2g and let P 2 MprðXÞ be such that Pðfx1gÞ ¼ 0:5. Then we denote by Fa;bðMbelÞ a subset of FðMbelÞ, con-
sisting of all total uncertainty measures, satisfying normalization conditions f ðghXiÞ ¼ a; f ðPÞ ¼ b for a; bP 0. Since P P ghXi,
we get that f ðPÞ 6 f ðghXiÞ for any f 2 FðMbelÞ, i.e. it should be required that aP b. If a ¼ b ¼ 0 then Fa;bðMbelÞ is a singleton,
which contains a functional that is identical to zero on Mbel. Therefore, it is necessary to consider Fa;bðMbelÞ with aP b and
a > 0.
Proposition 9. For any a > 0;Fa;0ðMbelÞ ¼ fGHg, where GH is the generalized Hartley measure with GHðghXiÞ ¼ a; jXj ¼ 2.
Proof. It is easy to check that GH satisﬁes Axioms 1–8 as a measure of total uncertainty, i.e. GH 2 Fa;0ðMbelÞ. We prove now
that f ðlÞ ¼ b1f ðl1Þ þ b2f ðl2Þ if f 2 Fa;0; l ¼ b1l1 þ b2l2; li 2 MbelðXÞ; bi P 0; i ¼ 1;2, and b1 þ b2 ¼ 1. This result means that
f 2 Fa;0ðMbelÞ is deﬁned uniquely and coincides with the generalized Harley measure. Notice ﬁrst that Corollary 5 implies that
f ðlÞ ¼ 0 if f 2 Fa;0ðMbelÞ and l 2 Mpr . Consider a system of pairwise disjoint sets fYigi¼1;2 with jYij ¼ jXj; i ¼ 1;2, and one-to-
one mappings wi : X ! Yi, and let ~l 2 MbelðYÞ, where Y ¼ Y1 [ Y2, be deﬁned by ~lðAÞ ¼
P2
i¼1bil
wi
i ðA \ YiÞ;A 2 2Y . By Axiom 6*;
we get f ð~lÞ ¼P2i¼1bif lwii þ f ð~lmÞ, where m : Y ! fY1;Y2g is deﬁned by mðyÞ ¼ Yiif y 2 Yi. In addition, ~lm 2 MprðfY1;Y2gÞ, i.e.
f ð~lmÞ ¼ 0, and f lwii
 
¼ f ðliÞ; i ¼ 1;2, by Axiom 2, hence, f ð~lÞ ¼ b1f ðl1Þ þ b2f ðl2Þ. Consider now a mapping u : Y ! X
deﬁned by uðyÞ ¼ w1i ðyÞ. If y 2 Yi, then ~lu ¼ l and, by Corollary 2, f ðlÞ 6 f ð~lÞ. That is, f ðlÞ 6 b1f ðl1Þ þ b2f ðl2Þ. On the
other hand, f ðlÞP b1f ðl1Þ þ b2f ðl2Þ by Corollary 3. Therefore, there is only one possibility f ðlÞ ¼ b1f ðl1Þ þ b2f ðl2Þ. h
Before addressing the general case of Fa;bðMbelÞ, we introduce a subset of Mbel, on which any f 2 Fa;bðMbelÞ has the same
value. Let l 2 MbelðXÞ, andFðlÞ be a set of focal elements of l. We say that l is a belief measure with disjoint focal elements
if A \ B ¼ ; for any distinct A; B 2FðlÞ. We denote by MbeljdðXÞ the set of all possible belief measures with disjoint focal ele-
ments on 2X .
Proposition 10. Let f 2 Fa;bðMbelÞ;l 2 MbeljdðXÞ, and let m be the Möbius transform of l. Thenf ðlÞ ¼ a
X
B2FðlÞ
mðBÞlg2jBj  b
X
B2FðlÞ
mðBÞlg2mðBÞ:Proof. Let l 2 MbeljdðXÞ and FðlÞ be a set of focal elements. Let Y ¼
S
B2FðlÞB and l0 2 MbeljdðYÞ be deﬁned by
~l ¼PB2FðlÞmðBÞghBi. It is clear that f ðlÞ ¼ f ð~lÞ by Axiom 2,FðlÞ is a partition of Y, and we can apply Axiom 6* for computing
f ð~lÞ. In this case, f ð~lÞ ¼PB2FðlÞ mðBÞf ðghBiÞ þ f ð~luÞ, where u : Y !FðlÞ is deﬁned by uðyÞ ¼ B;B 2FðlÞ, if y 2 B. It is clear
that ~lu 2 MprðFðlÞÞ and ~luðfBgÞ ¼ mðBÞ;B 2FðlÞ. Taking in account normalization conditions for f 2 Fa;bðMbelÞ, we get that
f ðghBiÞ ¼ alg2jBj, and f ð~luÞ ¼ b
P
B2FðlÞmðBÞlg2mðBÞ. h
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Hence, the construction of UT 2 Fa;bðMbelÞmay be conceived as an extension of UT onMbeljd toMbel. We know that this exten-
sion is unique if UT 2 Fa;0ðMbelÞ.
We introduce now functionals onMbel, which give us the upper and lower bounds of UT 2 Fa;bðMbelÞ. Consider a quasiorder
(i.e. reﬂexive and transitive relation) ‘‘^” on Mbel deﬁned by l1 
 l2 for l1 2 MbelðXÞ and l2 2 MbelðYÞ if there is a mapping
u : Y ! X such that lu1 6 l2. It is obvious that the introduced relation is reﬂexive and it is easy to check its transitivity. Let
lk 2 Mbel; k ¼ 1;2;3; l1^l2 and l2 
 l3. Then transitivity means that l1 
 l3. The last statement is proved as follows. If
l1 
 l2 then lu1 6 l2. Analogously, l2 
 l3 implies lw2 6 l3. Hence, lu	w1 6 lw2 6 l3 or l1 
 l3.
Lemma 11. Let UT be a measure of total uncertainty on Mbel. Then UTðl1ÞP UTðl2Þ if l1 
 l2.
Proof. By deﬁnition, l1 
 l2 means that lu1 6 l2 for some mapping u. Then using Axiom 3 and Corollary 2, we get
UTðl1Þ 6 UTðlu1 Þ 6 UTðl2Þ. h
Consider two functionals Ua;bT ;U
a;b
T on Mbel deﬁned byUa;bT ðlÞ ¼ inffUTðmÞjm 2 Mbeljd; m 
 lg;
Ua;bT ðlÞ ¼ supfUTðmÞjm 2 Mbeljd;l 
 mg:
According to Proposition 10, these functionals depend only on normalization conditions for total uncertainty measures in
Fa;bðMbelÞ and do not depend on a chosen special total uncertainty measure UT in Fa;bðMbelÞ. Therefore, we can use notations
Ua;bT ;U
a;b
T without any reference to a special total uncertainty measure UT 2 Fa;bðMbelÞ.
Proposition 11. The following statements are true: (1) Ua;bT 6 UT 6 U
a;b
T for any UT 2 Fa;bðMbelÞ; (2) Ua;aT ¼ S; and (3) Ua;0T ¼ GH.
Proof. The ﬁrst statement is obvious. The second statement follows from the fact that Ua;aT ðlÞ ¼ SðlÞ, i.e. the supremum can
be taken over all probability measures that dominate l in the formula for Ua;bT ðlÞ. Let mu ¼ l, where m 2 Mbeljd;l 2 Mbel, then
Ua;0T ðmÞ ¼ GHðmÞ and GHðmÞ ¼ GHðlÞ if juðAÞj ¼ jAj for any A 2FðmÞ, and GHðmÞ > GHðlÞ otherwise. It easy to see that we can
always construct such a measure m 2 MbeljdðYÞ and a mapping u : Y ! X that mu ¼ l and GHðmÞ ¼ GHðlÞ for any l 2 MbelðXÞ.
Therefore, Ua;0T ðlÞ 6 GHðlÞ. On the other hand, if mu 6 l, then GHðmÞP GHðmuÞP GHðlÞ, i.e. Ua;0T ðlÞP GHðlÞ. Hence,
Ua;0T ðlÞ ¼ GHðlÞ. h
Remark 5. Functionals Ua;bT ;U
a;b
T on Mbel, where aP b; a > 0, can be considered as candidates for the total uncertainty mea-
sure. But we need to check whether Axioms 2–7 are true. Axioms 3 and 4 are obviously fulﬁlled because of Lemma 11. Func-
tional Ua;bT is not a total uncertainty measure in general because according to Proposition 9 the total uncertainty measure in
Fa;0ðMbelÞ is deﬁned uniquely and coincides with the generalized Hartley measure. On the other hand, it is clear that
Ua;0T < U
a;0
T ¼ GH. It is desirable to check axioms also for Ua;bT . There is some evidence that Ua;bT may be a total uncertainty mea-
sure. However, this result has not been proven as yet.10. Disaggregations of total uncertainty on Mbel
We can deﬁne various conﬂict and nonspeciﬁcity measures depending on how we conceive of conﬂict-free information.
Let us ﬁrst analyze disaggregations based on GH and S. For this purpose, we introduce the following auxiliary lemmas.
The following, well-known lemma ([36, Section 1.3]) establishes the strict concavity of the Shannon entropy.
Lemma 12. Let P ¼ aP1 þ ð1 aÞP2, where P1; P2 2 MprðXÞ; P1 – P2, and a 2 ð0;1Þ. Then aSðP1Þ þ ð1 aÞSðP2Þ < SðPÞ.
Lemma 13. Let l 2 MbelðXÞ. Then SðlÞ  GHðlÞ ¼ 0 iff jFðlÞj ¼ 1.
Proof. It is clear that SðlÞ  GHðlÞ ¼ 0 if jFðlÞj ¼ 1, i.e. sufﬁciency is fulﬁlled. Let us show necessity. We associate to each
B 2FðlÞ the probability measure PB, deﬁned by PBðfxgÞ ¼ 1=jBj if x 2 B; PBðfxgÞ ¼ 0 otherwise. Consider the probability
measure P ¼PB2FðlÞmðBÞPB. It is clear that l 6 P, and SðPBÞ ¼ ln jBj, and by Lemma 12 SðlÞP SðPÞ ¼ S PB2FðlÞmðBÞPB  >P
B2FðlÞmðBÞSðPBÞ ¼ c
P
B2FðlÞmðBÞ ln jBj ¼ GHðlÞ. h
Lemma 14. Let l 2 MbelðXÞ and FðlÞ ¼ fBkg. Then SðlÞ ¼ 0 iff
T
kBk – ;.
Proof
Sufﬁciency. If
T
kBk ¼ B – ;, then we can take x 2 B and l 6 ghfxgi. Since SðghfxgiÞ ¼ 0, we get SðlÞ ¼ 0.
Necessity. Assume to the contrary that
T
kBk ¼ ;, but SðlÞ ¼ 0. The last equality leads to the conclusion that there is an
x 2 Xwith l 6 ghfxgi, i.e. lðX n fxgÞ ¼ 0. On the other hand, lðX n fxgÞ ¼
P
kjBk #XnfxgmðBkÞ ¼ 0 iff any Bk containsx, i.e.
x 2 TkBk. Necessity follows from this contradiction. h
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First interpretation. Let l 2 MbelðXÞ. Then UCðlÞ ¼ 0 iff l ¼ ghBi for some B 2 2X n ;.
Second interpretation. Let l 2 MbelðXÞ andFðlÞ ¼ fBkgmk¼1. Then UCðlÞ ¼ 0 iffFðlÞ is a chain in 2X, i.e. sets inFðlÞ can be
ordered such that B1  B2      Bm.
Third interpretation. Let l 2 MbelðXÞ and FðlÞ ¼ fBkg. Then UCðlÞ ¼ 0 iff
T
kBk – ;.
For the sake of convenience, we denote the set of all belief measures on 2X, which are considered as conﬂict-free w.r.t. the
ith interpretation, by MbeljiðXÞ; i ¼ 1;2;3.
Remark 6. It is easy to see that Mbelj2 is the set of all necessity measures on B 2 2X.
Next proposition allows us to deﬁne Hartley-like nonspeciﬁcity measures on MbelðXÞ for a given measure of total uncer-
tainty, and based on the introduced interpretations of conﬂict-free information.
Proposition 12. Let UT 2 FðMbelÞ and l 2 MbelðXÞ. Then the functionalGHiðlÞ ¼ sup
X
k
akUTðlkÞj
X
k
aklk P l;lk 2 MbeljiðXÞ; ak > 0;
X
k
ak ¼ 1
( )
;i ¼ 1;2;3, can be considered as nonspeciﬁcity measure, i.e. uncertainty measures UT ;UN ¼ GHi;UC ¼ UT  GHi obey Axioms 1–8.
Proof. It is clear that Axiom 1 is true. Axiom 2 follows from the statement that lu 2 MbeljiðYÞ for any l 2 MbeljiðXÞ and any
injection u : X ! Y . Let us check Axiom 4. Let lð1Þ;lð2Þ 2 MbelðXÞ and lð1Þ 6 lð2Þ. In this case any sum
P
kaklk, where
lk 2 MbeljiðXÞ; ak > 0;
P
kak ¼ 1, satisfying
P
kaklk P lð2Þ, is also bounded by lð1Þ, i.e.
P
kaklk P lð1Þ. It implies that
GHiðlð1ÞÞP GHiðlð2ÞÞ. It remains to check Axiom 8, i.e. GHiðlÞ 6 UTðlÞ for any l 2 MbelðXÞ. Consider a sum
P
kaklk, where
lk 2 MbeljiðXÞ; ak > 0;
P
kak ¼ 1, with
P
kaklk P l. Then
P
kakUTðlkÞ 6 UTð
P
kaklkÞ 6 UTðlÞ, i.e. GHiðlÞ 6 UTðlÞ. h
Proposition 13. For nonspeciﬁcity measures deﬁned in Proposition 12, the following is true:
(1) Let lð1Þ;lð2Þ 2 MbelðXÞ and let b1; b2 P 0 be such that b1 þ b2 ¼ 1. Then b1GHiðlð1ÞÞ þ b2GHiðlð2ÞÞ 6 GHiðb1lð1Þ þ b2lð2ÞÞ.
(2) Let X ¼ X  Y and l 2 MbelðXÞ. Then GHiðlXÞ þ GHiðlYÞP GHiðlÞ.Proof
(1) Let lðlÞ 2 MbelðXÞ; l ¼ 1;2, and l ¼ b1lð1Þ þ b2lð2Þ, where b1; b2 P 0; b1 þ b2 ¼ 1. We see thatb1GHiðlð1ÞÞ þ b2GHiðlð2ÞÞ ¼ b1 sup
X
k
að1Þk UTðlð1Þk Þ





X
k
að1Þk l
ð1Þ
k P l
ð1Þ; lð1Þk 2 Mbelji; að1Þk > 0;
X
k
að1Þk ¼ 1
( )
þ b2 sup
X
k
að2Þk UTðlð2Þk Þ



X
k
að2Þk l
ð2Þ
k P l
ð2Þ; lð2Þk 2 Mbelji; að2Þk > 0;
X
k
að2Þk ¼ 1
( )
¼ sup
X2
l¼1
X
k
bla
ðlÞ
k UTðlðlÞk Þ





X
k
aðlÞk l
ðlÞ
k P l
ðlÞ;lðlÞk 2 MbeljiðXÞ; aðlÞk > 0;
X
k
aðlÞk ¼ 1; l ¼ 1;2
( )
6 sup
X
k
akUTðlkÞ


X
k
aklk P l; lk 2 MbeljiðXÞ; ak > 0;
X
k
ak ¼ 1
( )
¼ GHiðlÞ:(2) Let X ¼ X  Y and l 2 MbelðXÞ. ThenGHiðlÞ ¼ sup
X
k
akUTðlðkÞÞj
X
k
aklðkÞ P l;lðkÞ 2 Mbelji; ak > 0;
X
k
ak ¼ 1
( )
6 sup
X
k
akðUTðlðkÞX Þ þ UTðlðkÞY ÞÞj
X
k
aklðkÞ P l; lðkÞ 2 MbeljiðXÞ; ak > 0;
X
k
ak ¼ 1
( )
6 sup
X
k
akUTðlkÞj
X
k
aklk P lX ; lk 2 MbeljiðXÞ; ak > 0;
X
k
ak ¼ 1
( )
þ sup
X
k
bkUTðlkÞj
X
k
bklk P lX ; lk 2 MbeljiðYÞ; bk > 0;
X
k
bk ¼ 1
( )
¼ GHiðlXÞ þ GHiðlYÞ: 
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X
B22Xn;
mðBÞUTðghBiÞ;wherem is the Möbius transform of l 2 Mbel. Because UTðghBiÞ ¼ HðlÞ, we see that GH1 is the usual generalized Hartley mea-
sure. The computation of GHi; i ¼ 2;3, is a hard optimization problem, as is demonstrated by examples in Appendix A.
It is easy to see that GHi for i 2 f1;2;3g is the smallest possible measure of nonspeciﬁcity under the condition that UN
obeys superadditive property w.r.t. any convex linear combination of belief functions, and the ith interpretation of con-
ﬂict-free information is accepted. This property of superadditivity is obligatory for measures of total uncertainty by
Corollary 3.
In the sequel, we will analyze what kinds of properties for uncertainty measures UN and UC are essential by making the
comparison with total uncertainty measures. In other words, we will check whether axioms for a total uncertainty measure
can be valid for UN and UC , and what conclusions can be made after accepting them. For this aim, we analyze the introduced
generalized Hartley measures and the minimal entropySðlÞ ¼ inffUTðPÞjP P l; P 2 MprðXÞg;
where l 2 MbelðXÞ, for measuring conﬂict. It is easy to check that the disaggregation, UN ¼ UT  S;UC ¼ S, satisﬁes all the
introduced axioms for uncertainty measures.
Let us analyze ﬁrst Axiom 5 and 6 for total uncertainty measures, which reﬂect their additivity properties.
By substituting in Axiom 5 a total uncertainty measure UT for UN and UC , we get the ﬁrst additivity property: let
l ¼ lXMghYi, where lX 2 MbelðXÞ, then UNðlÞ ¼ UNðlXÞ þ UNðghYiÞ and UCðlÞ ¼ UCðlXÞ þ UCðghYiÞ.
Observe that because of the disaggregation, this additivity property can be fulﬁlled for both uncertainty measures UN and
UC , i.e. we can prove it by checking one of them. Let lX and lY describe two random experiments. Then, because UCðghYiÞ ¼ 0,
the ﬁrst additivity property says that if we have only information about the ﬁrst experiment and no information about the
second experiment, in particular about connections between two experiments, then the conﬂict associated with two exper-
iments is the same as for the ﬁrst experiment.
Lemma 15. Uncertainty measures GHi; i ¼ 1;2;3, and S obey the ﬁrst additivity property.Proof. Assume that l ¼ lXMghYi, where lX 2 MbelðXÞ. Show ﬁrst that measures GHi; i ¼ 1;2;3, obey the ﬁrst additivity prop-
erty. Let us take an arbitrary sum
P
kaklk P l, where lk 2 MbeljiðX  YÞ; ak > 0;
P
kak ¼ 1. Then obviously
P
kaklk PP
kakðlkÞXMgY P l, where ðlkÞX  gY 2 MbeljiðX  YÞ. Vice versa, if
P
kaklk P lX , where lk 2 MbeljiðXÞ; ak > 0;
P
kak ¼ 1, thenP
kaklk  gY P lXMghYi ¼ l. Therefore,GHiðlÞ ¼ sup
X
k
akUTðlkMghYiÞ





:X
k
aklk P lX ;lk 2 MbeljiðXÞ; ak > 0;
X
k
ak ¼ 1
( )
¼ UTðlXÞ þ UTðghYiÞ:Let us check that S obeys the ﬁrst additivity property. Obviously, on one hand, SðlÞP inffUTðPXÞjPX P lX ; PX 2 MprðXÞg. On
the other hand, every PX  ghfygi 2 PðlÞ for PX 2 PðlXÞ and obviously UTðPX  ghfygiÞ ¼ UTðPXÞ. Therefore, SðlÞ ¼ SðlXÞ. h
By substituting in Axiom 6 a total uncertainty measure UT to UN and UC , we get the second additivity property: let
l 2 MbelðX  YÞ and lY 2 MprðYÞ, then UNðlÞ ¼
Pm
k¼1akUNðlkÞ and UCðlÞ ¼
Pm
k¼1akUCðlkÞ þ UCðluÞ, where ljyðAÞ ¼
lðA fygÞ=lYðfygÞ;A 2 2X .
The meaning of this property is the same as for a total uncertainty measure. Let l 2 MbelðX  YÞ be the description of two
random variables, nX and nY , and let, in addition, nY have an exact description, i.e. lY 2 MprðYÞ. Then UNðnX ; nYÞ ¼ UNðnX jnY Þþ
UNðnYÞ ¼ UNðnX jnY Þ;UCðnX ; nY Þ ¼ UCðnX jnY Þ þ UCðnYÞ. In the next it is also convenient to use the second additivity property in
the following equivalent form.
Additivity on disjoint sets. Let l ¼Pmk¼1aklk, where lk 2 MbelðXkÞ; ak P 0; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m; Pmk¼1ak ¼ 1, and Xk; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m,
are pairwise disjoint ﬁnite nonempty sets, i.e. fXkgmk¼1is a partition of X ¼
Sm
k¼1Xk. ThenUNðlÞ ¼
Xm
k¼1
akUNðlkÞ and UCðlÞ ¼
Xm
k¼1
akUCðlkÞ þ UCðluÞ;where u : X ! fX1; . . . ;Xmg is such that uðxÞ ¼ Xk if x 2 Xk.
The equivalence of these two properties can be shown as for total uncertainty measures (see Corollary 4).
Lemma 16. Uncertainty measures GHi; i ¼ 1;2;3, and S obey the second additivity property.Proof. First, we show that measures GHi; i ¼ 1;2;3, preserve the additivity on disjoint sets. Assume that l ¼
Pm
j¼1bjlj, where
lj 2 MbelðXjÞ; bk P 0; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m;
Pm
j¼1bj ¼ 1, and Xk; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m, are pairwise disjoint ﬁnite nonempty sets. Then obvi-
ously any g 2 MbelðXÞ such that g P l can be represented as g ¼
Pm
j¼1bjgj, where gj 2 MbelðXjÞ; j ¼ 1; . . . ;m. It follows from
this, in particular, that if g ¼Pkakmk P l, where mk 2 MbeljiðXÞ; ak > 0; Pkak ¼ 1, then g ¼Pmj¼1bjgj, where
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P
kjlk2MbeljiðXjÞakmk P bjlj and gj 2 MbelðXjÞ; j ¼ 1; . . . ;m, i.e. the computing of GHiðlÞ is divided on m independent opti-
mization problems:GHiðlÞ ¼ sup
Xm
j¼1
bj
X
k
ajkUTðljkÞ





X
k
ajkljk P lj;ljk 2 MbeljiðXjÞ; ajk > 0;
X
k
ajk ¼ 1
( )
¼
Xm
j¼1
bj sup
X
k
ajkUTðljkÞ





X
k
ajkljk P lj; ljk 2 MbeljiðXjÞ; ajk > 0;
X
k
ajk ¼ 1
( )
¼
Xm
j¼1
bjGHiðljÞ:Show that S preserves the additivity on disjoint sets. In this case, any P 2 PðlÞ can be represented as P ¼
Pm
j¼1bjPj, where
Pj 2 PðljÞ, i.e.SðlÞ ¼ inf UT
Xm
j¼1
bjPj
 !
jPj P lj; Pj 2 MprðXjÞ
( )
¼
Xm
j¼1
bj inf UTðPjÞjPj P lj; Pj 2 MprðXjÞ
n o
þ UTðluÞ
¼
Xm
j¼1
bjSðljÞ þ SðluÞ;where u : X ! fX1; . . . ;Xmg is such that uðxÞ ¼ Xk if x 2 Xk. h
Remark 8. We assume in the next that conﬂict and nonspeciﬁcity measures obey the ﬁrst and the second additivity prop-
erties. In some cases, these properties allow us to compute their values exactly using a measure of total uncertainty and the
chosen interpretation of conﬂict-free information. Let lk 2 MbeljiðXkÞ, where Xk; k ¼ 1; . . . ;m, are pairwise disjoint sets and let
us use the ith interpretation of conﬂict-free information. Then the second additivity property implies that
UNðlÞ ¼
Pm
k¼1akUTðlkÞ and UCðlÞ ¼ UTðluÞ. Moreover, the next example shows that any measure of conﬂict is not subaddi-
tive in the framework of considered axioms.
Example 3. Let l 2 MbelðX  YÞ such that X ¼ fx1; x2g;Y ¼ fy1; y2g, and l ¼ 0:5gA þ 0:5gB, where A ¼ fðx1; y1Þ; ðx2; y2Þg;B ¼
fðx1; y2Þ; ðx2; y1Þg. Consider an arbitrary UT 2 Fa;bðMbelÞ for b > 0. Then lX ¼ ghXi; lY ¼ ghYi; UCðlÞ ¼ b; UCðlXÞ ¼ 0;
UCðlYÞ ¼ 0, i.e. UCðlXÞ þ UCðlYÞ < UCðlÞ.
We can get other types of uncertainty estimation if we assume that Axiom 3 is also essential for measures of non-
speciﬁcity or measures of conﬂict. Using this assumption, we get the following results.Proposition 14. Let a measure of nonspeciﬁcity UN obey the following property: UNðluÞ 6 UNðlÞ for any u : X ! Y and any
l 2 MbelðXÞ, where X and Y are ﬁnite nonempty sets. Then UNðlÞ 6 GH1ðlÞ.
Proof. Let l ¼PB2FðlÞmðBÞghBi, where m is the Möbius transform of l andFðlÞ is the set of focal elements of l. Consider a
system of pairwise disjoint sets fYBgB2FðlÞ with jYBj ¼ jXj for all B 2FðlÞ and one-to-one mappings wB : X ! YB. Further-
more, let ~l 2 MbelðYÞ, where Y ¼
S
B2FðlÞYB, be deﬁned by ~l ¼
P
B2FðlÞmðBÞghwðBÞi. We see that UTðghwðBÞiÞ ¼ UTðghBiÞ by Axiom
2, and UNð~lÞ ¼
P
B2FðlÞmðBÞUTðghwðBÞiÞ according to Remark 8. Consider now a mapping u : Y ! X deﬁned by uðyÞ ¼ w1B ðyÞ if
y 2 YB. Then ~lu ¼ l and the condition of the proposition implies that UNðlÞ 6 UNð~lÞ ¼
P
B2FðlÞmðBÞUTðghBiÞ ¼ GH1ðlÞ. h
Corollary 9. The property of UN in Proposition 14 implies the ﬁrst interpretation of conﬂict-free information.
Proof. Let us recall that GH1 is the generalized Hartley measure, i.e. GH1 ¼ GH, and, by Lemma 13, SðlÞ  GH1ðlÞ > 0 if
jFðlÞj > 1, where l 2 MbelðXÞ and SðlÞ ¼ supf:UTðPÞjP 2 PðlÞg. Clearly, SðlÞ 6 UTðlÞ. Therefore, UCðlÞ ¼ UTðlÞ
UNðlÞP SðlÞ  GH1ðlÞ > 0 if jFðlÞj > 1, i.e. UC implies the ﬁrst interpretation of conﬂict-free information. h
Observe that the choice of UC ¼ S means that we use the third interpretation of conﬂict-free information and
UCðluÞ 6 UCðlÞ for any mappingu : X ! Y and any l 2 MbelðXÞ. We show now that S is the largest one among possible mea-
sures of conﬂict with the above properties.
Proposition 15. Let us accept the third interpretation of conﬂict-free information and let a measure of conﬂict UC obey the
following property: UCðluÞ 6 UCðlÞ for any u : X ! Y and any l 2 MbelðXÞ, where X and Y are ﬁnite sets. Then UCðlÞ 6 SðlÞ.
Proof. Let X ¼ fx1; . . . ; xng;l 2 MbelðXÞ, and P 2 PðlÞ. Then, using results from [29], we get that P ¼
P
B2FðlÞmðBÞPB, where
each PB 2 PðghBiÞ, and PðfxigÞ ¼
P
B2FðlÞjxi2BmðBÞPBðfxigÞ. Further, we get
l ¼
X
B2FðlÞ
mðBÞghBi ¼
X
xi2X
X
B2FðlÞjxi2B
mðBÞPBðfxigÞghBi:Let PðfxigÞ – 0. Then we denote
li ¼ ð1=PðfxigÞÞ
X
B2FðlÞjxi2B
mðBÞPBðfxigÞghBi:
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P
xi2XPðfxigÞli;li 2 Mbelj3ðXÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n.
Now, we show that the property formulated in the proposition implies that UCðlÞ 6 UTðPÞ. To do this, consider a system
of pairwise disjoint sets fYigi¼1;...;m with jYij ¼ jXj; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n, and one-to-one mappings wi : X ! Yi. Let ~l 2 MbelðYÞ, where
Y ¼ Sni¼1Yi, be deﬁned by ~lðAÞ ¼Pni¼1PðfxigÞlwii ðA \ YiÞ; A 2 2Y . According to Remark 8, we get UCð~lÞ ¼ UTð~lmÞ, where
m : Y ! fY1; . . . ;Yng is deﬁned by mðyÞ ¼ Yi if y 2 Yi. We see that ~lm 2 MprfY1; . . . ;Yng and ~lmðfYigÞ ¼ PðfxigÞ; i ¼ 1; . . . ;n.
Therefore, UTð~lmÞ ¼ UTðPÞ. Consider now a mapping u : Y ! X deﬁned by uðyÞ ¼ w1i ðyÞ if y 2 Yi. Then ~lu ¼ l, and the prop-
erty of this proposition implies that UCðlÞ 6 UCð~lÞ ¼ UTðPÞ. h
The results of this section can be easily extended to uncertainty measures on credal sets. For example, let UT be a
total uncertainty measure on Cr and P 2 CrðXÞ. Then we can use the following deﬁnition for the generalized Hartley
measure:GHiðPÞ ¼ sup
X
k
akUTðPðlkÞÞj
X
k
akPðlkÞ#P;lk 2 MbeljiðXÞ; ak > 0;
X
k
ak ¼ 1
( )
;where i ¼ 1;2;3. It is easy to check that Propositions 12 and 13 are also true if we consider uncertainty measures on Cr.
11. Additivity properties of uncertainty measures
The additivity property of uncertainty measures can be conceived of in two possible ways. Let us consider two random
variables nX and nY taking their values in ﬁnite nonempty sets X and Y, respectively. Then, in probability theory, we have the
following well-known properties of Shannon entropy:
(a) SðnX ; nYÞ ¼ SðnX jnY Þ þ SðnY Þ;
(b) SðnX ; nYÞ ¼ SðnXÞ þ SðnYÞ if random variables nX and nY are independent.
In the ﬁrst formula, SðnX jnY Þ measures the expected amount of uncertainty under the assumption that the value of nY is
known. Since SðnX jnYÞ ¼ SðnXÞ for independent random variables, (b) is a special case of (a). When attempting to generalize
(a) and (b) to imprecise probabilities, we encounter the following problems:
1. Independence principles can be considered perfectly only on arbitrary sets of probability measures, beyond the theories
of imprecise probabilities based on belief functions or credal sets.
2. The relation of independence (irrelevance) is not symmetrical, i.e. there are cases, when nY is irrelevant to nX , while nX is
not irrelevant to nY .
3. Let us consider a set P 2 SprðX  YÞ, where X;Y are ﬁnite sets. Then sets of probability measures Pjy; y 2 Y , and PY do not
contain sufﬁcient information to recover P. In other words, the descriptions of nX jnY and nY do not determine uniquely the
joint description of nX and nY .
The ﬁrst problem can be easily solved. We can extend axioms for uncertainty measures formulated for credal sets to arbi-
trary sets of probability measures. It is easy to check that in this case the total uncertainty measure deﬁned by
SðPÞ ¼ sup
P2P
SðPÞ obeys all these axioms. Let us further notice that we deﬁne some required additivity properties of a total
uncertainty measure in Axioms 5c and 6c. Axiom 5c postulates additivity property UTðnX ; nYÞ ¼ UTðnXÞ þ UTðnYÞ in the case
when nY is irrelevant to nX , considered in Lemma 3. According to Axiom 6c, UTðnX ; nYÞ ¼ UTðnX jnYÞ þ UTðnYÞ if the random var-
iable nY has an exact description PY ¼ fPYg, where PY 2 Mpr . The partial case of the last property is described in the following
lemma.
Lemma 17. Let nX and nY be random variables that take values in X and Y, respectively. Assume that nY is irrelevant to nX
(according to the deﬁnition given in Section 5) and PY ¼ fPYg, where PY 2 MprðYÞ is a description of nY . Then UTðnX ; nYÞ ¼
UTðnXÞ þ UTðnY Þ.
Proof. Let P 2 SprðX  YÞ be a joint description of nX and nY . Then by our assumption PY ¼ fPYg and, according to Axiom 5c,
we have UTðPÞ ¼
P
y2YPY ðfygÞUTðPjyÞ þ UTðPYÞ. We further notice that the condition ‘‘nY is irrelevant nX” implies that Pjy ¼ PX
for all y 2 Y by deﬁnition. Therefore, Py2YPYðfygÞUTðPjyÞ ¼ UTðPXÞ. Hence, UTðPÞ ¼ UTðPXÞ þ UTðPYÞ. h
When random variable nY has an inexact description, i.e. PY is not a singleton, the formula UTðPÞ ¼
P
y2YPY ðfygÞUTðPjyÞþ
UTðPYÞ in Axiom 6c can be generalized in such a way that PY is not exactly deﬁned, and we have only upper and lower esti-
mates of UTðPÞ byinf
PY2PY
X
y2Y
PYðfygÞUTðPjyÞ þ UTðPYÞ 6 UTðPÞ 6 sup
PY2PY
X
y2Y
PYðfygÞUTðPjyÞ þ UTðPYÞ: ð2Þ
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since the set fP 2 MprðX  YÞj8y 2 Y : Pjy 2 Pjy; PY 2 PYg is in general larger than P. Therefore, we can formulate the above
inequalities for sets P 2 SprðX  YÞ satisfyingP ¼ fP 2 MprðX  YÞj8y 2 Y : Pjy 2 Pjy; PY 2 PYg: ð3Þ
Then we say that a total uncertainty measure obeys the ﬁrst strong additivity property if (2) is fulﬁlled for all sets
P 2 SprðX  YÞ represented by (3). Next, we establish some properties of such additive total uncertainty measures.
Lemma 18. Let UT satisfy the ﬁrst strong additivity property and let P ¼ PXIPY . Then UTðPÞ ¼ UTðPXÞ þ UTðPY Þ.
Proof. In this case, Pjy ¼ PX for any y 2 Y , therefore,
P
y2YPYðfygÞUTðPjyÞ ¼ UTðPXÞ for all PY 2 PY , and we can rewrite (2) as
UTðPXÞ þ UTðPYÞ 6 UTðPÞ 6 UTðPXÞ þ UTðPYÞ. h
Remark 9. Lemma 18 has the following interpretation. Let random variables nX and nY be described by PX 2 SprðXÞ and
PY 2 SprðYÞ, in addition, nY is irrelevant to nX . Then, according to the maximum uncertainty principle, their joint description
should be deﬁned by P ¼ PXIPY , and this leads to UTðnX ; nYÞ ¼ UTðnXÞ þ UTðnYÞ if a measure of total uncertainty obeys the
ﬁrst strong additivity property.
Lemma 19. Let a functional f : Spr ! ½0;þ1Þ satisfy Axioms 2c, 3c, 4c, 7c and also the ﬁrst strong additivity property. Then f is a
measure of total uncertainty.
Proof. To prove the lemma, it is sufﬁcient to show that f obeys Axioms 5c, 6c. We see that Axiom 6c is a special case of the
ﬁrst strong additivity property, when PY ¼ fPYg; PY 2 MprðYÞ. Axiom 5c is a direct corollary of Lemma 18 when
PX ¼ PðgBÞ. h
The second generalization of the additivity has the following meaning. Let random variables nX and nY be independent and
described by PX 2 SprðXÞ and PY 2 SprðYÞ. Then their joint description P 2 SprðX  YÞ does not give us any additional informa-
tion if P ¼ PX  PY . Therefore, the direct generalization of b) isUTðPX  PYÞ ¼ UTðPXÞ þ UTðPYÞ: ð4Þ
If (4) is fulﬁlled for any PX 2 SprðXÞ and PY 2 SprðYÞ, we say that UT satisﬁes the second strong additivity property. The following
lemma is useful for showing some important implications of this property.
Lemma 20. Let UT be a measure of total uncertainty on Spr and P
ð1Þ;Pð2Þ 2 SprðX  YÞ be such that Pð1ÞX ¼ Pð2ÞX ;Pð1ÞY ¼ Pð2ÞY , and
Pð1Þ#Pð2Þ. Then UTðPð1ÞÞ ¼ UT Pð1ÞX
 
þ UT Pð1ÞY
 
implies UTðPð2ÞÞ ¼ UT Pð2ÞX
 
þ UT Pð2ÞY
 
.
Proof. Let the conditions of the lemma be fulﬁlled. Then UTðPð1ÞÞ 6 UTðPð2ÞÞ according to Axiom 4c. That is,
UTðPð2ÞÞP UTðPð2ÞX Þ þ UTðPð2ÞY Þ. However, UTðPð2ÞÞ 6 UTðPð2ÞX Þ þ UTðPð2ÞY Þ by Axiom 7c. Hence, UTðPð2ÞÞ ¼ UTðPð2ÞX Þ þ UTðPð2ÞY Þ. h
Remark 10. Lemma 20 allows us to make several simple conclusions. For example, if UT on Cr is additive w.r.t. S then it is
additive w.r.t. ;M;N . This follows from the inclusions proved in Proposition 5. It is worthy of noticing that, on the one
hand, any accepted type of additivity leads to additivity w.r.t. N , and, on the other hand, additivity w.r.t. N and Axiom
4c imply Axiom 7c.
Lemma 21. Let UT be a measure of total uncertainty on Spr and UTðPÞ ¼ UTðPXÞ þ UTðPYÞ for any P 2 SprðX  YÞ such that
P ¼ fPX  PY jPX 2 PX ; PY 2 PYg:Then UTis additive w.r.t. S;;M;N.
Proof. The truth of the lemma follows from inclusions P#PXSPY #PX  PY #PXMPY #PX N PY proved in Proposition 5
and Lemma 20. h
Proposition 16. The maximum entropy functional S satisﬁes both the ﬁrst and second strong additivity properties of a measure of
total uncertainty on Spr.
Proof. It is easy to see that Ssatisﬁes the second strong additivity property, because it is additive for any set P 2 SprðX  YÞ,
considered in Lemma 21. We need to show that the ﬁrst strong additivity property is also fulﬁlled. Let us consider an arbi-
trary set P 2 SprðX  YÞ that satisﬁes (3). According to the deﬁnition of supremum, there is a sequence fPðkÞg1k¼1#P, such that
SðPÞ ¼ lim
k!1
SðPkÞ. Every SðPðkÞÞ is represented as SðPðkÞÞ ¼Py2YPðkÞY ðfygÞSðPðkÞjy Þ þ SðPðkÞY Þ. Because PðkÞjy 2 Pjy for all y 2 Y and
PðkÞY 2 PY ,SðPðkÞÞ 6 sup
PY2PY
X
y2Y
PYðfygÞSðPjyÞ þ SðPYÞ;
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PY2PY
X
y2Y
PYðfygÞSðPjyÞ þ SðPYÞ:The second inequality is proved as follows. Let sequences PðkÞjy
n o1
k¼1
#Pjy; y 2 Y , and PðkÞY
n o1
k¼1
#PY be such that
SðPjyÞ ¼ limk!1SðPðkÞjy Þ; y 2 Y; SðPYÞ ¼ limk!1S PðkÞY
 
. Then we form a sequence fPðkÞg1k¼1# SprðX  YÞ by PðkÞðfðx; yÞgÞ ¼
PðkÞjy ðfxgÞPY ðfygÞ for all x 2 X and y 2 Y . It is easy to see that fPðkÞg1k¼1#P. Therefore,inf
PY2PY
X
y2Y
PY ðfygÞSðPjyÞ þ SðPY Þ 6 lim
k!1
X
y2Y
PðkÞY ðfygÞSðPjyÞ þ SðPY Þ
¼ lim
k!1
X
y2Y
PðkÞY ðfygÞSðPðkÞjy Þ þ SðPðkÞY Þ
 !
¼ lim
k!1
SðPðkÞÞ 6 SðPÞ: Remark 11. Using the same technique as in the proof of Lemma 7, it is possible to show that the set P belongs to CrðX  YÞ in
(3) if Pjy 2 CrðXÞ for all y 2 Y and PY 2 CrðYÞ, i.e. the introduced strong additivity properties can be equivalently formulated
for credal sets.12. The uniqueness of a total uncertainty measure under the law of conﬂict-nonspeciﬁcity transformation
In this section we look more carefully at the behavior of conﬂict and nonspeciﬁcity measures and their interaction. It is
clear that conﬂict can be converted to nonspeciﬁcity. Actually, let a situation be described by a probability measure
P 2 MprðXÞ. Then, according to Axiom 1, UNðPÞ ¼ 0, and evidently UCðPÞ ¼ UTðPÞ. If we fully lose this information, we describe
the new situation by measure ghXi and, by Axiom 1, we have UCðghXiÞ ¼ 0 and UNðghXiÞ ¼ UTðghXiÞ. Using probabilistic inter-
pretation of belief functions, we can say if we have two situations described by l1;l2 2 MbelðXÞ and l1 6 l2, then the ﬁrst
situation described by l1 can be considered as an imprecise description of the second situation. Therefore, for any situation
described by l 2 MbelðXÞ, its more precise descriptions form a set fg 2 MbelðXÞjg P lg.
Let us analyze the value supfUCðgÞjg 2 MbelðXÞ; g P lg. On one hand, this value measures the potentially maximal conﬂict
associated with belief function l. On the other hand, the valueUð1ÞN ðlÞ ¼ supfUCðgÞjg 2 MbelðXÞ; g P lg  UCðlÞ;
measures the amount of conﬂict that has been transformed to nonspeciﬁcity. Therefore, a measure of nonspeciﬁcity consists
of two parts: Uð1ÞN ðlÞ;Uð2ÞN ðlÞ ¼ UNðlÞ  Uð1ÞN ðlÞ, where Uð1ÞN ðlÞ can be transformed to pure conﬂict and Uð2ÞN ðlÞ cannot. If we
accept this supposition, then we should also accept that for any l 2 MbelðXÞ there exists a P 2 MprðXÞ; P P l, such that
UCðPÞ ¼ Uð1ÞN ðlÞ þ UCðlÞ. Hence, we may argue that UCðlÞ 6 supfUCðPÞjP 2 MprðXÞ; P P lg or Uð1ÞN ðlÞ ¼ supfUCðPÞjP 2
MprðXÞ; P P lg  UCðlÞ. We see that Uð1ÞN ¼ S  UC , whereSðlÞ ¼ supfUTðPÞjP 2 MprðXÞ; P P lg; l 2 MbelðXÞ; ð5Þ
is the upper entropy measure. Now we can analyze the disaggregation of a total uncertainty measure consisting of three
parts UT ¼ Uð1ÞN þ Uð2ÞN þ UC . We see that, on one hand, there is an interaction between Uð1ÞN and UC , therefore, neither of these
uncertainty measures can be used properly alone. On the other hand, S ¼ Uð1ÞN þ UC can be used as a measure of total uncer-
tainty, and there is no interaction between Uð2ÞN and S
. Therefore, we may postulate that Uð2ÞN has to obey all axioms for a total
uncertainty measure.
We formulate our conclusions as a law of conﬂict-nonspeciﬁcity transformation as follows.
1. UCðlÞ 6 SðlÞ for any l 2 MbelðXÞ, where SðlÞ is deﬁned by formula (5).
2. Measure of nonspeciﬁcity can be split in two parts, Uð1ÞN ¼ S  UC and Uð2ÞN ¼ UT  S, where Uð1ÞN can be transformed to
pure conﬂict.
3. Uð2ÞN is a total uncertainty measure.Proposition 17. Let UT 2 Fa;bðMbelÞ; aP b > 0, and let UT obey the law of conﬂict-nonspeciﬁcity transformation. Then UT is
deﬁned uniquely and it is represented by UT ¼ S þ GH, where S 2 Fb;bðMbelÞ is the upper entropy and GH 2 Fab;0ðMbelÞ is the
generalized Hartley measure.
Proof. Let UT 2 Fa;b, where aP b > 0, obey the law of conﬂict-nonspeciﬁcity transformation. Then UT ¼ S þ Uð2ÞN , where
obviously S 2 Fb;bðMbelÞ and Uð2ÞN should be in Fab;0ðMbelÞ. By Proposition 9, Uð2ÞN coincides with the generalized Hartley
measure. hRemark 12. Clearly, if a ¼ b in Proposition 17, then UT ¼ S. If a > b in Proposition 17, then UT ¼ S þ GH and, obviously,
Uð2ÞN ¼ GH. In this case, Uð1ÞN and UC can be chosen using known disaggregations of S, for example, we can choose UC ¼ S
and Uð1ÞN ¼ S  S.
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The presented investigation provides us with new foundations for analyzing uncertainty measures in the theories of
imprecise probabilities. The introduced system of axioms for uncertainty measures can be equivalently formulated through
monotone set functions (up to 2-monotone measures) and credal sets. We show that the upper entropy measure and a linear
combination of the upper entropy and the generalized Hartley measure can be taken as candidates for total uncertainty mea-
sures. We indicate also some possible disaggregations of a measure of total uncertainty into two parts measuring amounts of
nonspeciﬁcity and conﬂict. Moreover, some results regarding characteristics of possible measures of nonspeciﬁcity and con-
ﬂict are obtained for three possible interpretations of conﬂict-free information.
The following are some open problems:
1. Are sets Fa;0ðM2monÞ;Fa;0ðCrÞ empty? It is likely that Fa;0ðM2monÞ – ;, i.e. the generalized Hartley measure can be linearly
extended to the set of 2-monotone measures. However, it is impossible to extend it up to general credal sets, because of
violation of its subadditivity property.
2. Are sets Fa;bðMbelÞ; a > 0; aP bP 0, singletons? This uniqueness problem is linked with checking whether the functional
Ua;bT is a total uncertainty measure or not. If U
a;b
T is a total uncertainty measure, then, for example, Fa;aðMbelÞ contains con-
vex linear combinations aUa;aT þ ð1 aÞUa;aT and it is possible to prove that it is also jFa;aðCrÞj– 1.
3. What kind of additional justiﬁable properties should measures of nonspeciﬁcity and conﬂict possess?
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Appendix A. Examples of computing values of nonspeciﬁcity measures GHi; i ¼ 1;2;3
Example 4. Let X ¼ fx1; x2; x3; x4g;l 2 MbelðXÞ, and let the Möbius transform m of l be deﬁned by
mðfx1; x2gÞ ¼ 1=3; mðfx2; x3gÞ ¼ 1=3; mðfx3; x4gÞ ¼ 1=3. Using the algorithm described in [3] for computing S, we ﬁnd that
maxA22Xn;lðAÞ=jAj ¼ 1=4, and this maximum is obtained for X. Therefore, we take PðfxkgÞ ¼ 1=4, and SðlÞ ¼ ln 4. GH1
coincides with generalized Hartley measure, and we obtain GH1ðlÞ ¼ ln 2. For computing GHiðlÞ; i ¼ 2;3, it is required to
solve the optimization problemGHiðlÞ ¼ sup
X
k
akS
ðlkÞ





X
k
aklk P l;lk 2 Mbelji; ak > 0;
X
k
ak ¼ 1
( )
:First we ﬁnd the lower estimate of GHiðlÞ, computingsi ¼ sup
X
k
akS
ðlkÞ





X
k
aklk ¼ l;lk 2 Mbelji; ak > 0;
X
k
ak ¼ 1
( )
:For i ¼ 2, the representation P3k¼1aklk ¼ l;lk 2 Mbelj2 is unique: ak ¼ 1=3; k ¼ 1;2;3;l1 ¼ ghfx1 ;x2gi;l2 ¼ ghfx2 ;x3gi;l3 ¼
ghfx3 ;x4gi. Therefore, s2 ¼ ln 2.
For i ¼ 3, we have P2k¼1aklk ¼ l, where a1l1 ¼ ð1=3Þghfx1 ;x2gi þ að1=3Þghfx2 ;x3gi and a2l2 ¼ ð1 aÞð1=3Þghfx2;x3giþ
ð1=3Þghfx3 ;x4gi;a 2 ½0;1. Using the algorithm for computing maximal entropy, we ﬁnd that the maximum is obtained for
a ¼ 1=2 and SðlkÞ ¼ ln 3; k ¼ 1;2. Hence, s3 ¼ ln 3.
Consider now another belief function deﬁned byl ¼ ð1=6Þghfx2gi þ ð1=6Þghfx3gi þ ð1=6Þghfx1 ;x2gi þ ð1=6Þghfx3 ;x4gi þ ð1=6Þghfx1 ;x2 ;x3gi þ ð1=6Þghfx2 ;x3 ;x4gi:We see that l P l and there is a decomposition l ¼ ð1=2Þl1 þ ð1=2Þl2, wherel1 ¼ ð1=3Þghfx2gi þ ð1=3Þghfx1 ;x2gi þ ð1=3Þghfx1 ;x2 ;x3gi;
l2 ¼ ð1=3Þghfx3gi þ ð1=3Þghfx3 ;x4gi þ ð1=3Þghfx2 ;x3 ;x4gi:It easy to check that lk 2 Mbelj2 and SðlkÞ ¼ ln 3; k ¼ 1;2. Therefore, GH2ðlÞP 3.
Let us try now to ﬁnd another belief function, whose decomposition gives us a greater lower estimate of
GHiðlÞP 3; i ¼ 2;3. It is easy to see that such a function should contain X as focal element in its Möbius representation. Let
l ¼ aghfx2gi þ aghfx3gi þ bghfx1 ;x2gi þ bghfx3 ;x4gi þ cghfx1 ;x2 ;x3gi þ cghfx2 ;x3 ;x4gi þ dghXi:
A. Bronevich, G.J. Klir / International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 51 (2010) 365–390 389Then l P l iff aP 1=6; aþ bP 1=3; 2aþ bþ c P 2=3; 2aþ 2bþ 2c þ d ¼ 1; b; c; dP 0. Such a function with the maximal
value d isl ¼ ð1=3Þghfx2gi þ ð1=3Þghfx3gi þ ð1=3ÞghXi:
Consider the decomposition l ¼ ð1=2Þl1 þ ð1=2Þl2, where l1 ¼ ð2=3Þghfx2gi þ ð1=3ÞghXi and l2 ¼ ð2=3Þghfx3gi þ ð1=3ÞghXi.
Then SðlkÞ ¼ ð2=3Þ lnð2=3Þ  ð1=3Þ lnð1=9Þ ¼ ð4=3Þ ln 3 ð2=3Þ ln 2 < ln 3. Therefore, l does not give us a greater lower
estimate of GHiðlÞ. Let a ¼ 1=4; b ¼ 1=12; c ¼ 0; d ¼ 1=3. Thenl ¼ ð1=4Þghfx2gi þ ð1=4Þghfx3gi þ ð1=12Þghfx1 ;x2gi þ ð1=12Þghfx3 ;x4gi þ ð1=3ÞghXi:
Consider the decomposition l ¼ ð1=2Þl1 þ ð1=2Þl2, wherel1 ¼ ð1=2Þghfx2gi þ ð1=6Þghfx1 ;x2gi þ ð1=3ÞghXi;
l2 ¼ ð1=2Þghfx3gi þ ð1=6Þghfx3 ;x4gi þ ð1=3ÞghXi:We see that SðlkÞ ¼ ð1=2Þ lnð1=2Þ  ð1=2Þ lnð1=6Þ ¼ ln 2þ ð1=2Þ ln 3 > ln 3. Since lk 2 MbeljiðXÞ; k ¼ 1;2; i ¼ 2;3, we get
GHiðlÞP ln 2þ ð1=2Þ ln 3, which is the greatest lower estimate of GHiðlÞ among the considered belief functions.
Example 5. Let X ¼ fx1; x2; x3g and l ¼ ð1=2Þghfx1 ;x2gi þ ð1=2Þghfx2 ;x3gi. Then GH1ðlÞ ¼ ln 2 and GH3ðlÞ ¼ S
ðlÞ ¼ ln 3. We will
try to compute GH2ðlÞ, using l 2 MbelðXÞ;l P l deﬁned by l ¼ aghfx2gi þ bghfx1 ;x2gi þ bghfx2 ;x3gi þ cghXi. The coefﬁcients
should satisfy the following inequalities: aþ bP 1=2; aþ 2bþ c ¼ 1; a; b; cP 0. Let a ¼ 1=3; b ¼ 1=6; c ¼ 1=3. Then
l ¼ ð1=3Þghfx2gi þ ð1=6Þghfx1 ;x2gi þ ð1=6Þghfx2 ;x3gi þ ð1=3ÞghXi. Consider the following decomposition of l: l ¼ ð1=2Þl1þ
ð1=2Þl2, wherel1 ¼ ð1=3Þghfx2gi þ ð1=3Þghfx1 ;x2gi þ ð1=3ÞghXi;
l2 ¼ ð1=3Þghfx2gi þ ð1=3Þghfx2 ;x3gi þ ð1=3ÞghXi:Then Sðl1Þ ¼ Sðl2Þ ¼ ln 3, i.e. GH2ðlÞ ¼ ln 3.References
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